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ABSTRACT 
When the Republic of Moldova gained independence after the dissolution of the 
USSR, the new country adopted a position of neutrality in world politics. Since then, 
Moldova’s leaders have become interested in joining the European Union (EU), but there 
is internal debate about how best to gain admission to this important European institution. 
Some political leaders state that Moldova could achieve EU membership while 
maintaining its neutral strategic status. Other politicians, however, call for abolishing 
neutrality, and advocate Moldova’s EU integration through NATO membership.  
While states which chose a status of permanent neutrality were traditionally seen 
as entirely aside from multinational institutional security processes, the post-Cold War 
EU enlargement process experienced admission of permanent neutral countries such as 
Austria. Additionally, over the years, the EU also accepted states that had been 
previously granted NATO membership, such as Latvia.  
This study analyses Austria’s neutral and Latvia’s aligned EU integration 
processes and tests them against Moldova’s realities in order to see how Moldova can 
integrate into the EU in the fastest time and at the least possible cost. The thesis 
concludes that though the Moldovan status of permanent neutrality seems fairly 
irrelevant, this strategy should be maintained for the time being in order to reduce 
anticipated Russian objections, and thus facilitate the Republic of Moldova integration 
process into the European Union.      
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A.  PURPOSE  
This thesis investigates whether the Republic of Moldova can achieve its desire to 
join the European Union (EU) and still maintain a status of neutrality. The basic objective 
of the present study is to determine whether, in today’s world, EU membership is 
compatible with neutrality - a question germane not only to Moldova but to some other 
European nations as well. Given the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and its 
association with NATO – twenty-one of the twenty-seven EU countries are also NATO 
members – it is unclear whether Moldova would be able to maintain both its neutral 
status and EU membership. 
Thus, the central question to be answered is: Will Moldova’s status of neutrality 
benefit, have no influence on, or jeopardize its efforts to join the EU? Also, the study will 
analyze what benefits or hardships may this neutrality pose to Moldova it its pro-EU 
endeavor and whether Moldova can afford seeking EU membership with a neutrality 
clause.   
B.  IMPORTANCE  
The Republic of Moldova has been a neutral country since 1994. As stipulated in 
the Constitution, Moldova cannot be involved in military conflicts outside its borders, 
join military alliances of any kind, permit foreign military troops on Moldovan soil, or 
allow its territory to be used by other countries for military operations against another 
state.1  
In addition, the Republic of Moldova has positioned itself against violence, has 
declared that it has no enemies, and observes a purely defensive military strategy. 
Nonetheless, though without the Moldovan government’s consent, the Russian 
Federation has had a military force on the Republic’s territory for nearly seventeen years, 
in blatant violation of Moldova’s neutral status. Furthermore, Russia has been in no hurry 
                                                 
1 Republic of Moldova Parliament, “Republic of Moldova Constitution,” Art.11, (29 July 1994), 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/moldova3.pdf (accessed 15 August 2007).  
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to practically recognize Moldova’s neutrality and withdraw its troops, a presence that 
directly undermines the country’s national security. Moldova’s central government has 
also lost control of Transnistria,2 an area in the eastern part of the country that not only 
seeks secession but also maintains its own military force, supported by the Russian troops 
in the region.3 
In 2003, after twelve years of uncertainty whether to choose the West or the East, 
the Moldovan government announced that the country wanted to join the European 
Union. At the same time, however, Moldova seeks to maintain its neutral values and its 
ties with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Thus, in 2006, it 
signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the North-Atlantic Alliance. 
Some critics view this course of action – Moldova’s retention of tight relations with 
NATO while being illegally occupied by a contingent of Russian troops – as a position of 
neither de facto neutrality nor national security. 
One result of this so-called “Moldovan security dilemma” is that the local 
political forces are divided into two camps in a national debate. One side, the center-left-
wing parties, insists that a status of neutrality serves the country’s security interests by 
showing the international community that Moldova has peaceful intentions. And that, it 
claims, enables the state to allocate more funds for social and other important needs than 
for expensive defense measures. Neutrality, they argue, will ultimately make Russia 
withdraw its troops and, consequently, solve the Transnistrian problem, thereby preparing 
the way for Moldova’s smooth integration into the EU. In sum, this side claims, the 
neutrality policy must be maintained.  
The other side, the right-wing political parties, believes that Moldova’s neutral 
status works against its national security interests by making the country unable to defend 
itself in the Machtpolitik world. Citing the presence of Russian troops in Moldova as 
evidence, the right-wingers argue that, because neutrality is not observed by the stronger 
                                                 
2 Other names for the territory of Transnistria that occur in contemporary literature are Transdnestira, 
Pridnestrovie, and Pridnestrovskoe Moldsvskaya Respublika (PMR). This thesis uses Transnistria, the 
name used in the political system of Moldova. 
3 Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism (Westport, Connecticut/ London: Praeger 
Publishers, 2004), 100. 
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international actors (Russia), Moldova’s neutral position distances the country from 
attaining security through alignment with other European countries in military coalitions. 
And that resulting insecurity, they further argue, jeopardizes Moldova’s integration into 
the EU. This argument is based on the right-wing parties’ belief that the EU is primarily a 
security-based community that does not need or want to include insecure or weak states. 
Thus they opt in favor of refuting neutrality and joining NATO, a step that would 
strengthen Moldovan security and eventually make the country more attractive and 
acceptable to the EU. 
The importance of this thesis lies in its efforts to identify scholarly theories that 
view neutrality as a security strategy, to test the theories against empirical data, and to 
ultimately determine which of the two sides in the Moldovan political debate is most 
realistic. The thesis concludes with recommendations about the choices that Moldovan 
politicians must make to further the country’s acceptance into the EU in the shortest time 
and at the lowest possible price possible. 
C. THE GENERAL CONTEXT  
1.  Literature on Neutrality  
Within the field of international relations, neutrality as a security strategy is 
approached and described in a number of different ways. The major schools of thought 
maintain opposing approaches to the advantages and disadvantages of a neutrality 
posture, dividing scholars into neutrality realists and neutrality idealists. 
Neutrality realists see the world as a ‘jungle’4 in which every state has always to 
prepare for war and balance power against enemies, usually through joining convenient 
alliances. Realists characterize neutral countries as “dependent variables” (DV) that are 
trying to respond to external threats and pressures that they can neither influence nor 
control individually. Therefore, the realists view neutrality as a necessity for survival 
rather than a virtue.  
                                                 
4 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism. Liberalism, and Socialism (New 
York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 18. 
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In contrast, neutrality idealists see neutral actors as “independent variables” (IV) 
able to influence the international system. They believe that by being neutral these 
countries have the power to have a strong voice in international politics. Thus, they 
perceive neutrality as a tool for accomplishing valuable goals.5  
Historically, there have been a number of European countries that have endorsed 
a status of neutrality. Some of them, for example, Sweden,6 view neutrality as much more 
than a security strategy, as a way of thinking, a part of their national identity and way of 
life. For others, such as Austria, neutrality served as a necessity for maintaining their 
sovereignty and independence, protecting them from the Great Powers and enabling them 
to act independently in international politics.7 
2.  Neutrality, Alignment and the European Union 
The European Union is a community of states that share similar democratic 
values, common markets, legal aspirations, and common security. In order to exercise 
security requirements the European Union relies on its second pillar through Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
Some Eastern-European countries such as Latvia used their alignment status and became 
part of the European family by fully committing to the European political and military 
policies and joining the EU and NATO at the same time. 
Since ESDP indeed includes a military dimension, one may suppose that the EU 
looks like a military alliance; thereby, undermining the principle of neutrality. However, 
some neutral European states such as Austria were welcomed into the EU, and did not 
need as radical a transformation of statecraft in order to obtain EU membership.  
                                                 
5 Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel present a basic comparison of the two schools of thought in 
their book, Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects foe Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
6 Mikael af Malmborg, Neutrality and State: Building in Sweden (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 
2001). 
7 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London / New York: Routledge, 1988). 
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It will be thus interesting to analyze why some nations fully commit to the rigors 
of EU foreign and defense policy in order to obtain the same results that other get by 
partial commitment of same.  
3.  The Republic of Moldova  
As was noted earlier, Moldova had inherited Russian troops on its territory from 
its Soviet time and wished to get rid of them. And, apparently, Moldova’s political elites 
embraced the status of neutrality in 1994 as a means to gain the support of the 
international community in making Russia withdraw its military. The tactic, however, 
does not seem to work.8  
As will be shown here, the Republic of Moldova still has various incentives for 
maintaining a neutral security strategy. But it is time for its political leaders to reassess 
the threats and challenges the country faces, identify the benefits and disadvantages of 
neutrality in contemporary Europe, and calculate the price to be paid for either abolishing 
its status of neutrality, maintaining it, or adopting a third way. In any case, Moldova must 
identify a feasible strategy that is adaptable in keeping with the European Union’s 
common system of values. 
D.  METHODOLOGY  
The thesis methodology will involve the use of case-study research to test existing 
theories on neutrality against empirical data and objectively determine an appropriate 
policy path for the Republic of Moldova. It consists of five chapters. 
Chapter I introduces the general content of the thesis and the way the research 
will be illustrated. 
                                                 
8 “Protecting the interests of ethnic Russians or ‘Russian-speakers’ was one of the chief justifications 
offered by Moscow for its involvement in the 1992 Transnistria war and remains a favorite argument 
among those who support a continued Russian military presence.” See: Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: 
Russia’s New Imperialism (Westport, Conn./ London: Praeger Publishers, 2004); Charles King, “Eurasia 
Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face,” Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994-1995); Allen C. Lynch, “The 
Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001); Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling 
to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War,” International Security 21, no. 2, 
(1996). 
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Chapter II will focus on traditional concept of neutrality in order to examine and 
determine its principles and requirements. The author will use the alliance-formation 
principle to test the permanent neutrality policies of certain European states. It will also 
illustrate the positive and negative aspects of neutrality as a security strategy. The chapter 
will also analyze the Republic of Moldova’s status of permanent neutrality, testing it 
against the traditional concept of permanent neutrality. We will investigate the relevance 
of Moldova’s neutrality to its national security, given the state’s initial incentives for 
choosing the very status, its geographic, economic and military capabilities, as well as the 
foreign influence. 
Chapter III will analyze how the EU can accommodate aligned and neutral states 
at the same time. It will try to identify whether security strategies of candidate states 
influence their EU integration process. For this intent, we will use the case of Austria’s 
EU integration process trying to understand how it could join an organization based on 
reciprocity, while maintaining a neutral clause. We chose Austria as a case study because 
it endorsed a status of neutrality in 1955 as a tool for survival between the Western and 
Eastern blocs during the Cold War. By doing so Austria compelled the great powers to 
withdraw from its territory unlike the case of the FRG and GDR.9 Thus, one might well 
argue that the case of the Austrian state treaty in 1955 was very similar to the current 
situation of the Republic of Moldova where Moscow is again involved in its traditional 
way. Additionally the chapter will see how Latvia as an aligned state integrated into the 
EU and whether its status of alignment helped or made no difference within the 
integration process. Latvia was chosen as a non-neutral case study state because it has a 





                                                 
9 See Josef L. Kunz, “Austria's Permanent Neutrality,” American Journal of International Law 50, no. 
2 (1956): 418-425; Michal Koran, “Austrian Neutrality: Burden of History in the Making or Moral Good 
Rediscovered?” Perspectives, no. 26 (Summer 2006): 23; Josef Binter, “Neutrality, European Community 
and World Peace: The Case of Austria,” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 4 (1989): 413-418. 
 7
Moldova, was under Russian control during the Soviet Union era and inherited a large 
Russian-speaking minority and other numerous Soviet “values” that could jeopardize its 
“Westernization.”10 
Chapter IV will analyze the European Union’s and Russia’s views toward 
Moldova’s desire to integrate into the EU while maintaining its neutral status. Because 
the two actors are the main powers that may influence the integration process, the chapter 
will have separate sections that refer to them individually. Then, the chapter will take into 
consideration the lessons that Austria and Latvia experienced during their EU integration 
process. 
Chapter V will test the resulting data from the Austrian and Latvian EU 
integration process against the actual situation in Moldova. This process will allow us to 
estimate what price the country would pay for adopting either of the two courses of 
action that are advocated by the two sides in the country’s internal debate: Moldova’s 
integration into the EU while maintaining permanent neutrality, or abolishment of 
Moldova’s neutral status and its integration as an aligned state. 
Chapter VI will summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each course of 
action, and will make recommendations about future strategies that Moldovan political 
elites could use to integrate the country into the EU in the shortest possible amount of 
time and at the lowest price.  
                                                 
10 See Fred Weir, “Baltics Step from Russia's Shadow into Western Club,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, (20 November 2002): 1; Kim Murphy, “Russians Again Foreigners in Latvia: As the Baltic State 
Begins its Integration With the West, Resentment of the Past Empire Surfaces to Close Many Doors to 
Longtime Residents,” Los Angeles Times, Home Edition (1 May 2004): 3. 
 8
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II. NEUTRALITY AS A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: 
ORIGINS, CONDITIONS, AND REALITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When nation states emerged as main the actors in the international system and the 
concept of war was still relevant - the notion of national security became extremely 
important. Ever since, states have used a variety of strategies in order to ensure their 
national security, mainly according to the balance of power theory. 
This chapter does not address the notion of national security itself, as each nation 
state understands and interprets it intuitively and individually. Nor does the chapter 
analyze the relevance of balance of power. Rather, it will focus on one specific security 
strategy, that of neutrality, in order to examine and determine its effectiveness. The 
chapter will use the alliance-formation principle to test the permanent neutrality policies 
of certain European states. It will also illustrate the positive and negative aspects of 
neutrality as a security strategy. 
In the first part of the chapter, the author will conduct his analysis at the system 
level, looking at the reasons that states choose neutrality, the ways that they formulate 
their national security strategies, the measures they must take to maintain an effective 
neutral status, and the ways that the international system may influence the neutral 
security strategy. In the analysis process, the dependent variable will be “effective 
neutrality.” Independent and intervening variables will also be analyzed.  
The second part of the chapter will analyze the Republic of Moldova’s status of 
permanent neutrality, testing it against the traditional concept of permanent neutrality, as 
well as against the examples of other neutral states. We will investigate the relevance of 
Moldova’s neutrality to its national security, given the state’s initial incentives for 
choosing neutrality, its geographic, economic, and military capabilities, and foreign 




the general principles of traditional neutrality and empirical cases revealed by our thesis 
research. This analysis arrives at a set of general conclusions and a separate conclusion 
specific to the Republic of Moldova’s neutral status. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIES FOR ITS ACHIEVEMENT 
1.  The Concept of National Security and the Balance of Power 
Historically, the antecedents to the 20th century “national security” dates back at 
least as far back as 1648 when the Treaty of Westphalia generated a new concept of 
sovereign dynastic states as primary actors within the European international system. 
Hobbes was the first to use the term in reference to the basic concept of security that 
coincided with the origination of definitive “states.” The security of the state within the 
dynastic system of the European great powers gave new energy to ideas from the 
renaissance about the modern state within the system of powers. Hobbes, along with 
Machiavelli, provided the basics of classical realism. According to Hobbes, the 
international system, whereby states exist in a permanent struggle against one another for 
survival and nationals refer to their sovereign for protection against foreign threats, is 
anarchic.11 Subsequent realists, debating against the supporters of Kantian and Grotian 
security paradigms, brought to the fore the importance of power in states’ struggles for 
survival.12 Thereafter, a vast number of scholars have debated these concepts, bringing 
different empirical data into the discussion in an effort to falsify the realist approach. the 
history of European wars since the seventeenth century greatly supports Hobbes’s 
national security paradigm.  
European dynastic states engaged in wars primarily in order to survive. While 
some began wars of expansion, to maximize their power, being driven by greed and 
dynastic ambitions,13 others were dragged into those fights in self-defense, to preserve 
                                                 
11 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961/1957). 
12 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, ed. Kenneth W. 
Thompson (USA: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1993), 10-11. 
13 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
11. 
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their sovereignty and independence and protect their nationals. Even today, a good 
number of researchers who are focused on national security often use the Hobbesian 
paradigm to show that it is national security, not international security or global 
governance, which is the core interest of nation states.14 
The realist approach to national security was later transformed by the neo-realist 
paradigm, which replaces an earlier emphasis on the strategy of maximizing power with 
the notion that nation states seek security.15 In his research, the founder of neo-realism, 
Kenneth N. Waltz, agrees with the classical realists that the international system is 
anarchic and that it is the states that play the primary role. Waltz argues that the system 
integrates nation states (units) into a “self-help” interaction in which they are concerned 
primarily with their survival, and it is this concern that regulates the states’ behavior. The 
final end that units seek in the system is security, and enhancing power in order to 
achieve greater capabilities, in Waltz’s opinion, may, but not necessarily, serve this end. 
He claims that the primary goal of nation states is not maximizing power, but rather 
maintaining and/or improving their position in the international system.16 
Since Waltz “puts” the anarchy of the international system vis-à-vis the nation 
states’ pursuit of ultimate security, he concludes that, “In an unorganized realm each 
unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one 
else can be counted on to do so.”17 Therefore, since states value their security above all 
else, they will do anything possible to maintain it. National security researchers have 
argued for a long time about what this value means, or should mean for all states. 
However, the empirical evidence shows that sometimes states cite national security as a 
reason for attacking others (e.g., the U.S. invasion of Iraq), others see national security as 
the need to defend themselves from aggression (as many European countries did against 
Nazi Germany in World War II), while still others cite national security as a reason to 
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engage in ongoing wars even though they have not been attacked directly (e.g., Great 
Britain in World War II). Apparently, therefore, the value of national security and the 
means to maintain it vary from country to country and from one historical case to 
another.18 In addition, a number of different measurements of values are incorporated in 
individual states’ concepts of national security.  
Nonetheless, most scholars agree that the traditional concept of national security 
undoubtedly includes the protection of a state’s political sovereignty and independence 
and its territorial integrity.19 To protect those values, nation states rely heavily on military 
power, combined with various other adopted means and strategies, as one of the most 
important tools for defending their national security against a variety of threats.20 As 
Waltz puts it, “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared 
to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.”21 However, 
states differ considerably in terms of their capabilities, including their military strength, 
and some states may be unable to defend themselves against a potential threat. Therefore, 
in an anarchical international system, states balance power against stronger potential 
opponents.22  
The balance-of-power theory addresses the way that states get together to 
withstand a greater threat. This theory, as researched by Steven M. Walt, depends on 
alliance-formation principles to explain the way some states combine their multiple 
resources in an effort to prevent or defend themselves against other more powerful states 
or coalitions that might pose a threat.23 Walt, who analyzed the work of other important  
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scholars in the field, including K. Waltz, K. Oye, and G. Snyder, describes two primary 
strategies – “balancing behavior” and “bandwagoning”24 – that states use when joining 
an alliance.  
A state practicing a balancing behavior strategy will tend to align with other weak 
states to form a greater force against a more powerful eventual threat. A state’s decision 
to align with other weak states suggests that, in such an alliance, all involved parties, 
besides increasing their common power, avoid the risk of being influenced by the other 
partners because their individual power is relatively equal.25 Balancing is beneficial 
because it does not necessarily rest (although it may) on friendship, but on the common 
threat. Thus, all the involved parties must cooperate and oppose the problem out of their 
own self-interest.26 
In contrast, the bandwagoning strategy, when practiced, means aligning with the 
threatening actor to avoid being attacked and tends to switch the possibility of becoming 
a victim with that of being an ally. Another reason to bandwagon, even when a state is 
not being threatened, might be to join the more powerful side in a confrontation so as to 
share in the achievement of an expected victory. Bandwagoning can be exercised, 
therefore, for defensive as well as offensive (pragmatic) reasons.27 
There are multiple reasons for adopting one of the two strategies for achieving a 
relative level of security. One motive might be an assessment of the other party’s 
aggregate and proximate power and its offensive capabilities and intentions. Additionally, 
in choosing between the two options, a state’s own values are of key importance. What 
are its interests at this specific point in time? Who rules the country? There are also other 
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intentions, for instance, in cases where the state has no potential allies and is in the 
proximity of a more powerful actor28 or is facing powerful internal threats.29 In those 
situations, a state may have no choice but to bandwagon.  
Earlier, we spoke briefly about the meaning of the basic concept of national 
security within the international relations framework and the way that nation states create 
a balance of power at times to withstand a threat. This chapter does not intend, however, 
to analyze why and how states balance power, although a brief description was necessary. 
The chapter will explain another different, very specific strategy for maintaining national 
security – the strategy of neutrality. The next section will illustrate how this strategy is 
practiced by some small states. 
2.  Neutrality as a National Security Strategy 
a.  Neutrality: Definitions and Principles  
Neutrality “can be viewed in its Latin roots ne uter, or ‘neither of two,’ in 
war.”30 Throughout history, neutrality was often used by states as a strategy to avoid 
getting involved in undesired wars. This use mainly illustrates the position of a party 
between or toward other (two or more) belligerent sides.31 Originally, though some 
European states often maintained neutrality, the concept was seen as immoral by 
belligerents who assumed that by avoiding the struggle, a neutral state enjoys peace while 
at the same time hoping to benefit from the war’s outcome.32  
Though many of the great European powers, at some point in their history, 
also maintained neutrality toward others’ wars, this section will focus only on small states 
that adopted neutrality. We assume, in this respect, that if, for great powers in a hostile 
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anarchic realist world, maintaining neutrality is a matter of costs and benefits, then, for 
small states, taking into consideration the unequal distribution of capabilities, neutrality is 
a question of survival. Thus, the hypothesis posed in this section is that small states 
situated between more superior, belligerent states with relatively equal power, will 
assume that a threat exists from all sides and, therefore, will choose the status of 
neutrality as a way to avoid confrontation.   
In our discussion, we assume that the “smallness” of a state is indicative of 
its relatively minimal strength for confronting any more capable belligerent. For small 
states especially, as was already mentioned, the traditional balance-of-power theory 
suggests that they will seek to align with one of the rival actors so as to obtain the 
protectorate of the common allied power in any eventual war. But because small states 
are sometimes afraid of being influenced by their stronger allies or are unwilling to make 
concessions that may not serve their national interests,33 some of those states may want to 
adopt a status of neutrality. In contrast to the balance-of-power theory, the traditional 
concept of neutrality suggests that adopters prefer to rely on “non-alignment means” – 
such as their own deterrent recourses, effective diplomacy, and/or the existing rivalry 
between the belligerents – rather than count on more powerful allies. Because such 
positioning exposes the vulnerability of the neutral state to all the possible belligerents at 
the same time, its continued use of the neutrality strategy rests on its ability to assure the 
outside camps of the reliability of its neutrality 
Historically, the concept of neutrality, like alliance formation, was 
embraced by various states at times in ad hoc terms. Therefore, there was no real 
legitimacy in such a stand: states would change their status from neutral into belligerent, 
and vice versa, from war to war or even during the same war.34 Therefore, at the 1899 
and 1907 Hague Conventions, to define the rights and obligations of belligerents and 
neutrals in times of war, the status of neutrality was institutionalized and neutral states’ 
rights and duties were recognized by international law. This was an important step in the 
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process of gaining “approval” for turning states’ neutral position toward war into a 
national security strategy and was first agreed by European Great Powers at the Congress 
of Vienna in 1815 when a status of permanent neutrality was imposed on Switzerland.35 
According to the Hague Conventions, neutral states had been granted a set 
of benefits that had to be observed by belligerent states. The benefits included, primarily, 
protection by international law of neutral nation-states’ political sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity. In addition, belligerents are prohibited from 
conducting military operations on a neutral state’s land, sea, or air without the latter’s 
consent and from using the neutral’s territory for placing communications installations 
and transporting troops, weapons, and other military supplies. Moreover, foreign states 
must not establish military units within a neutral country, use that state’s existing 
facilities for any military purposes, or conduct military recruitment of that state’s 
nationals. Any failure to observe these principles by belligerent states is considered an 
external violation of a state’s neutrality and, in addition, constitutes a violation of 
international law.36 
At the same time, neutral states acquired a number of obligations that rest 
on the principle of impartiality – divided into passive and active impartiality – toward 
belligerent parties. Passive impartiality obligates the neutral state to treat equally the 
belligerent sides engaged in a struggle, prohibits any support to a side that might 
negatively affect that side’s enemy. The neutral country is not forbidden, however, to 
trade (including arms) with belligerent parties, but if a decision is made to apply any sort 
of sanctions, they must be applied equally to all rival camps.37  
Active impartiality rests on the duty of a neutral state to use any means 
(including use of force if necessary) to prevent any country from exploiting its territory 
(land, sea, or air) for military purposes. Not only does the neutral state have the right not 
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to be exploited for military reasons by any belligerent, it is also obliged to protect those 
rights. A neutral states’ failure to fulfill its obligations is both an internal violation of its 
own neutrality and a violation of international law.38  
The major schools of thoughts on neutrality maintain opposing positions 
on its advantages and disadvantages, with scholars divided accordingly into neutrality 
realists and neutrality idealists. The realists see the world as a “jungle”39 in which every 
state is always preparing for war, balancing power against its enemies, usually by joining 
convenient alliances. Thus, the realist approach characterizes neutral countries as 
dependent variables that are trying to respond to external threats and pressures that they 
cannot influence individually, much less control. Therefore, the realists characterize 
neutrality as a necessity for survival rather than a virtue. For neutral states, as Martin 
Wight explains, this often means maintaining a low profile: “Neutral (states) are states 
without any active foreign policy at all, their hope is to lie low and escape notice.”40 In 
contrast, neutrality idealists see neutral actors as independent variables able to influence 
the international system. They consider that, by being neutral, these countries have the 
power to have a strong voice in international politics. Thus, to the idealists, neutrality is a 
tool for accomplishing valuable goals.41 
This thesis will not attempt to determine which of these two schools of 
thought is correct. It does point out, however, that historically, most states that start wars 
do so for their own gain. Over the years, various states have initiated wars for profit, 
hoping that by struggle they will gain control over values that others possess, values that 
can be broadly classified as strategic and economic. Consequently, small states, 
especially if they have important resources, will always be subject to threats from more 
powerful actors.  
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Whatever the reasons are for their neutral status, there is no denying that 
states value their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Even if they may 
use that neutrality as a tool of their foreign policy, the basic need of neutral states seems 
to be to find a way to protect themselves from belligerents. Survival is the predominant 
need that makes all else possible, including the exercise of a foreign policy. And taking 
into account these states’ relatively weak defense resources and permanent exposure to 
belligerents, the only way a neutral state can avoid being exploited is by protecting its 
neutral status, in other words, by achieving a recognized status of permanent neutrality.42 
b.  Neutrality: Choice and Protection 
Since there is no guaranty that belligerent states will respect international 
law in respect to neutral states, the latter, in attempting to maintain the status quo, must 
convince belligerents of the credibility of their permanent neutral status. In others words 
a policy of “permanent neutrality may be defined as a policy of consistent non-alignment 
in peacetime, overtly aimed at preparing the ground for neutrality in wartime.”43 It rests 
on the credibility of a state’s neutral intentions both during peace and during war. To 
achieve such a credibility level, the neutral state has a number of options, which are 
classified as either positive or negative components of its neutral strategy. 
The positive component includes the neutral state’s ability to persuade 
belligerent parties of the advantages they may gain from the state’s neutrality. This 
capability rests, in turn, on the neutral state’s ability to illustrate a different context of 
possible trade-offs, maximizing the costs to the belligerents of violating neutrality over 
the benefits from supporting the status quo. To convince belligerents that their neutrality 
has a mutual value, neutral states may offer so-called tertiary services that the rival 
parties cannot get otherwise from other non-neutral countries. These services might 
include conciliation and meditation activities for the fighting camps, various forms of 
humanitarian assistance, or other technical services.44 The main point of the benefits is 
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that they be more valuable to belligerents than the gains they would get from a neutrality 
violation. It is equally important that the tertiary services be in the belligerents’ interest, 
so that any one of them would recognize self-interest in respecting the nonalignment of 
the neutral state.45  
One historical example of the use of a positive component is Sweden’s 
mediation between Finland and the Soviet Union during their 1939–1940 war. Sweden 
played an important role in helping both parties reach a relatively mutual and convenient 
peace settlement. During World War II, Switzerland served as one of the few points of 
contact between the Axis and Allied powers. Indeed, Swiss had an important role in 
negotiating the surrender of Nazi forces in Italy.46 Neutral states try during peacetime, 
also, to provide tertiary services, by conducting different conferences, formal and 
informal meetings, and workshops. During the Cold War, for instance, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Austria offered their territory as a neutral location for leaders of the 
Western and Eastern powers to meet and discuss bilateral issues. 
The negative component of neutrality includes certain methods to deter 
belligerents from violating a state’s neutral privileges by, for example, showing the 
disproportionality between the costs and the benefits. Like the positive component, the 
negative one also intends to prevent the belligerents from violating states’ neutrality. But 
if the positive component means political, diplomatic, and humanitarian means, the 
negative component may also include maximizing internal defensive resources, 
especially military capabilities.47 The negative component of neutrality is characterized 
by offensive and defensive strategies. 
The offensive strategy, of the negative neutrality component, includes 
striking at belligerents’ weak points, usually domestically, but not in a military manner. A 
good example of this was Ireland during World War II. When threatened by the United 
Kingdom, the Irish government used its political and diplomatic connections to influence 
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the United States, one of Britain’s primary allies, domestically. In addition to asking 
Washington to support its neutrality against an eventual British invasion, Ireland lobbied 
the U.S. Congress and also attempted to influence Irish-American voters. As a result the 
U.S. administration, pressed by the Congress and the risk of unwelcome results at the 
upcoming election, persuaded the British government to abandon its intention to violate 
Ireland’s neutrality.48 
The defensive strategy, of the negative component, includes direct 
deterrence of threatening actors by building military capabilities and infrastructure that 
show that a neutral state is prepared and willing to protect itself, thereby persuading 
potential aggressors that the costs of an eventual violation will be high. Using this 
strategy does not mean that the neutral state hopes to actually defeat the aggressor. It is 
rather a means to maximize the opponent’s war costs. It also takes into account the 
relatively equal power between two or more belligerents in a war, when any one of them 
may be highly unable to afford risking a high number of resources from their main war 
effort. It makes the aggressor review the trade-offs and eventually give up possible 
attempts to harm the neutral.49 
A good example of neutral states’ exercising such a defensive negative 
strategy is that of Switzerland and Sweden in the first phase of the Second World War. 
When threatened by Nazi Germany, both countries raised as large a national military 
force as possible. They also mined their strategic industrial plants, threatening to destroy 
them in case of an attack. Hitler viewed the Swiss and Swedish industries as potential 
resources that would benefit his war effort (Germany was benefiting in part already from 
the existing trade). Once convinced that those resources could be demolished, he 
reassessed the trade-offs and rejected the idea of attacking those states. Hitler understood 
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minimal benefit if the two countries were rendered industrially useless. “(N)ot only 
would the invasion have brought no benefits to Germany, but it would have constituted a 
significant burden.”50 
Within the international system there are also so-called status quo states, 
and though, in theory, every state has the right to adopt a neutral status, there are a 
number of important factors that may influence that decision. As already discussed, there 
is always a possibility that greedy, expansionist countries will seek to exploit others for 
strategic and economic profit. It appears, therefore, that the more strategic a state is, the 
more vulnerable it is to potential danger. A peripheral country that values its current 
position in the international system and has no incentive for change could easily choose a 
neutral status. Being far from any great powers, it is not of strategic interest to rival 
states. And even if it is, its distance constitutes an increased cost for belligerents and 
makes it less likely that they will attempt to conquer it. There is one exception to this 
general rule, however. States that are peripheral but neighbor a more powerful actor are 
completely at its mercy. These so-called rimstates’ security policies necessarily depend 
on their strong neighbors’ policies and intentions. Thus, they may be tempted to 
bandwagon with their neighbor in order to avoid confrontation.51 But if the rimstate is 
able to persuade its powerful neighbor of the importance of its neutrality, the neighbor is 
more likely to support that neutrality’s continuance. Good examples of this are those of 
Ireland and Finland, whose neutrality after World War II was supported by NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact, respectively, during the Cold War. 
Isolated, strategically unimportant states have a better chance to maintain 
their neutrality whereas the so-called buffer states are the most threatened. A buffer state 
is one that is situated between two major potential rivals. And whereas during peacetime 
potential belligerents might avoid confrontation and be mutually interested in maintaining 
a buffer state’s neutrality, in wartime, because of its strategic importance, a buffer state 
has a greater chance to be exploited by either side. Moreover, the more equal the balance 
of power between two rivals at war, the greater the chance that a buffer states will be 
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attacked, since each belligerent will try to gain control of the strategically important 
neutral state.52 This hypothesis is supported by the historical situation faced by Belgium, 
Norway, and the Netherlands in World War II. It is reasonable for buffer states in these 
circumstances, therefore, not to choose a status of neutrality, but rather to try to seek 
alignment with other states in peacetime and thereby avoid becoming a two-way target 
during a war.  
In sum, status quo states may choose a neutral status to avoid being 
dragged into the wars of more powerful states, although conditions may not always allow 
them to do so. Depending on their strategic position and economic status, certain states 
are of great interest to belligerents and thus are more threatened than less important 
states. On the other hand, it is the neutral’s strategic and economic strength that can 
support its neutrality if used wisely. States that choose a neutral strategy as a means to 
maintain their national security, need to protect that status. And though the rights and 
benefits of neutral states are stipulated in international law, there is no guaranty that the 
law will always be observed. Therefore, while respecting their obligations and refuting 
internal violations of their neutrality, neutral states should use all means possible to 
protect their neutrality from external violations. As the empirical data shows, Belgium 
and Norway’s permanent neutrality, based only on their declarations of that status, did 
not prevent them from being invaded in both the First and the Second World Wars. 
Switzerland and Sweden, despite conducting a positive neutrality strategy, could also 
have been dragged into the same wars if their negative component strategy had been 
absent. The conclusion that we derive from this evidence is this: to protect their 
neutrality, states must use a combination of positive and negative neutrality component 
strategies, or at least have the capability to do so. This is easier to achieve when there is a 
certain level of interdependency between the belligerents and the neutral.53 
The next section will discuss the Republic of Moldova’s status of 
neutrality. It will investigate the incentives and conditions Moldova had for adopting a 
neutral national security strategy and consider whether neutrality is a relevant status for 
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Moldova. The section also explores the ways that Moldova approached to its neutrality 
and how this status looks in traditional terms. Finally, it will summarize how Moldova’s 
neutral strategy currently serves its national security interests. 
C.  THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA’S STATUS OF NEUTRALITY AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE COUNTRY’S NATIONAL SECURITY  
1.  Moldovan Neutrality and its Legacy 
Since 1994, the Republic of Moldova has been a neutral country. Its neutral status 
is stipulated in the Constitution and commits the country to refrain from involvement in 
military conflicts outside Moldova’s borders, joining military alliances of any kind, 
permitting foreign military troops on Moldovan soil, or allowing Republic of Moldova 
territory to be used by other countries for military operations against any state.54 The 
Republic of Moldova has a position against violence, has declared itself to have no 
enemies, and observes a purely defensive military strategy.55 
Internally, the Moldovan government assured neutrality’s legacy by gaining the 
support of the populace, which voted for the neutral status of the country in a national 
referendum in March 1994. In addition to being stipulated in the state’s Constitution, its 
status of neutrality is included in the Republic’s National Security Concept, Military 
Doctrine, and Foreign Policy Concept. The Constitution says that the abolishment of 
Moldova’s neutral status requires a majority vote by the people in a national referendum 
and not otherwise.56 However, Moldova’s neutrality has never been recognized, and no 
other state or international organization has committed to guarantee its neutrality (a 
question to be researched in Chapter IV). Besides, its neutral status is mentioned only in 
internal legal government documents, nowhere else.57 Therefore, in the international  
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arena, there is no guarantee of its neutrality, and because it does not have a recognized 
history of neutrality, like Sweden, for instance, Moldova’s neutrality seems merely a self-
imposed status.  
2.  Incentives for Moldovan Neutrality  
What caused the Moldovan authorities originally to adopt a neutral strategy? That 
decision is rooted in the fall of the USSR when a strong national movement arose in 
Moldova, just as happened in the Baltic republics and the Caucasus. This movement 
sought to restore the Romanian language as the Republic’s official language, the old 
‘tricolor’ flag, and Latin script. All of these had been Moldovan values until the USSR 
imposed its Soviet substitutes. As part of the national movement, also, Moldova sought 
union with Romania. At the same time, as a result of Soviet occupation, many Russian, 
Ukrainian, and other people settled in Moldova. Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, 
about 26 percent of Moldova’s population was made up of Russian, Ukrainian, or other 
Russian-speaking people. Though that does not seem a large overall percentage, the 
majority of it was concentrated in the eastern part of the country, so-called Transnistria, 
and cheered by a few power-hungry leaders, a secessionist anti-Moldovan mood was 
created.58 
The Moldovan nationalistic movement, on one hand, and the Russian-speaking 
population’s fear of becoming discriminated against in an eventual “united Romania,” on 
the other, resulted in ethnic pressure. However, though inter-ethnic feelings were intense, 
there was relatively little hostility, and at that time it was still possible for the leadership 
on both sides to avoid conflict. However, by the spring of 1992, political immaturity on 
the Moldovan side, the will to gain political power on the Transnistrian side, and the 
Russian separatists’ support by the former 14th Soviet Army’s presence in Transnistria 
led to the two parties’ engagement in military hostilities. 
The Russian military was not only supplying the Transnistrian militia with arms 
and ammunition, but also actively participating in clashes against the Moldovan 
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government forces.59 Thus, the President of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, accused Russia of 
beginning a “non-declared war” and called on the international community to stop the 
Russian aggression.60 But getting no support, to stop the bloodshed, he had later to agree 
to Russia’s conditions in order to stop the conflict. After the hostilities were settled and a 
new status quo achieved, in 1994 Moldova and Russia signed an agreement stipulating 
that the cease-fire agreement “was to be monitored by multilateral ‘peacekeeping’ forces” 
composed of former Moldovan and Transnistrian belligerent forces, along with Russian 
troops from the area.61 The agreement also included a stipulation for the withdrawal of 
the Russian military by 1997, which was to be “synchronized with the granting of special 
political status to Transnistria.”62 Thus, apparently, Transnistria was granted de facto 
independence from Moldova, while Russian troops in Moldova attained a legal 
“peacekeeping” status.  
During the earliest stages of Moldova’s independence, therefore, the Moldovan 
government received no support from the Western powers while facing considerable 
external and internal threats – from the Russian Federation and the Transnistrian 
secessionist movement – and was at the mercy of the Russians. Given these factors, the 
government seemed to see neutrality as the best possible solution. However, some 
political annalists argue in this regard that, because of a lack of balance of power in the 
region, Moldova was “neutralized” by Russia, which had certain future plans regarding 
this geo-strategic location.63 
In choosing neutrality, Moldova’s leaders sought several results. First, for a young 
country that was militarily weak, neutrality was seen as the key to cheap Moldovan 
security. Second, with the public and political elites divided into pro-Russian and pro-
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Romanian sides, and given the armed conflict, neutrality was chosen as a means to bring 
the society together and reintegrate the country. Third, given the Western states’ “refusal” 
to interfere in the problem of Russian aggression toward Moldova, it was hoped that 
neutrality would prevent direct Russian control. In addition, finally, neutrality was 
necessary in order to have Russia withdraw its troops from Moldova as soon as 
possible.64 
3.  Moldova’s Political Elites’ Approach to the State’s Neutrality  
Moldova’s form of neutrality and the initial incentives for choosing it, are similar 
to the those of some other countries. Moldova’s intention to consolidate as a state, for 
example, is similar to Switzerland’s neutrality incentive. Moldova’s desire to expel the 
Russian troops from its sovereign territory resembles the onetime situation in Austria. 
The fact that Moldova’s neutrality status is not stipulated in any international document 
and is internally driven, makes it look like Sweden’s neutral realm. The geo-political 
situation of Moldova in the beginning of 1990s that pushed it to adopt the status of 
neutrality was very similar with that of Finland’s after the Second World War, when 
Moldova, though not bordering Russia, found itself in a status of rimstate because of the 
unequal balance of power in the region  
However, there are also aspects that make Moldova a unique case, a factor that 
Moldova’s political leaders apparently do not understand or ignore. First, in comparison, 
Austria accepted neutrality in return for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops,65 
whereas Moldova became “neutralized” merely in the hope of such an outcome. Second, 
all European neutrals took the choice for a neutral strategy very seriously. They made it a 
core pillar of both their internal and external policies. They also worked hard to achieve  
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the credibility of their neutrality by exercising some of the positive and negative 
neutrality components discussed above, and by recognizing the attendant obligations 
under international law and protecting their rights.  
In contrast, the Republic of Moldova lacks international recognition of its 
neutrality and fails to preserve it internally. Moldova has never tried to show that its 
neutrality benefits others and offers no tertiary services. It is true that the Cold War 
provided European neutral states with opportunities to demonstrate their neutral 
commitment, while Moldova, with the disappearance of clear rivals, has not had that 
chance. But if we take a close look at European neutrals, we find that even in the absence 
of a clear division of belligerents nowadays, they find ways to prove their neutrality 
around the world. And they continue to offer different helpful services that focus on 
various humanitarian and peace-support operations.66 Whereas besides reiterating its 
position against the continued presence of Russian troops, however, Moldova does not 
demonstrably protect its neutrality.  
The international community’s misunderstanding of Moldova’s position appears 
to have resulted from the latter’s initial internal policy. When Russia supported the armed 
rebellion of Transnistrian separatists in 1992 and participated in direct confrontations 
with Moldovan forces, Moldova’s politicians called these actions “aggression” against its 
sovereignty. They then appealed to the United Nations and the Western powers for 
support and even thought about declaring war on Russia.67 Later, the same politicians 
agreed with the Russia’s conditions to settle the peace and “legalized” Transnistria’s de 
facto independence and the Russian military presence. Finally, they also stipulated in 
government documents that Moldova had no enemies.68 How could they expect such a 
mismatch to be understood internationally? It was obvious in 1992 that Moldova did face  
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one external threat, the Russian Federation69 and Moldova’s leaders, who at the time 
chose to hide their heads in the sand like frightened ostriches, thinking that no one would 
notice, ignored the reality that the international community was not blind.  
4.  Neutrality versus Real Processes: Mismatching and its Impact on the 
Country’s National Security 
At the political-economic level, in 1994, Moldova declared Russia its strategic 
partner, initiated intense diplomatic and economic relations, and joined the Russian-led 
regional organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).70 Nine years 
later, while still advocating its presence in the CIS, Moldova announced its desire to also 
integrate into the European Union (EU). Because the EU is an organization that also 
relies on common security norms besides its economy-based appearance, one may argue 
that an eventual integration into the EU should pose a future challenge to Moldova’s 
neutrality. If traditional neutral countries shall be on neither side, Moldova appears to be 
willing to stay on both sides, a position that can hardly be called neutrality.  
Then, in contrast to other neutral countries, besides not providing any tertiary 
services, Moldova does not even seem to be interested in participating in peace-support 
operations (PSO), except for providing some Military Observers under the UN and OSCE 
flags.71 One could say that Moldova’s economic situation is weak and cannot afford 
sophisticated services. But if Bangladesh can participate in peace-support operations, 
there is no reason to think that Moldova cannot, given that there are legal bases for doing 
so. Instead, while Moldova’s laws regarding participation in PSO stipulate eventual 
involvements only under UN or OSCE mandates,72 joining the United States’ Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in 200373 was a clear internal violation of Moldova’s neutral status. It is 
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quite difficult to comprehend why a country that can (and should as a neutral) participate 
in missions according to its own laws does not do it, whereas participates in missions 
against the laws. This discrepancy does nothing to support Moldova’s neutrality either.  
Another gap occurs when we analyze the idea that, to be effective, neutrality 
should be based on both economic power and an advanced interdependency between the 
neutral and belligerents. From this perspective also, Moldovan neutrality does not appear 
relevant, since Moldova does not have the capability to negatively support its neutrality. 
Indeed, there is little hope it can deter other powers,74 as is obvious by the Russians 
refusal to withdraw their troops. Moldova cannot afford an offensive deterrence because 
of the lack of interest groups in potential belligerent countries, especially Russia. On the 
other hand, a defensive deterrence is not possible either, because Moldova’s economic 
dependence on Russia is so great that neutrality is not likely to push the latter to observe 
Moldova’s rights under international law. This was demonstrated by Russia itself when, 
in 2006, it banned Moldovan agriculture products, leaving Moldovan authorities with no 
choice but to beg for a lifting of these sanctions.75 In any imaginable neutral offensive 
operation, Moldovan authorities would also not be able to use the threatening tactics used 
by the Swiss and the Swedish during World War II, because there are no strategic 
installations in Moldova that a potential belligerent would highly value. Therefore, at a 
negotiating table, there is only a very narrow space for maneuver that Moldovan elites 
could use, and very limited (if any) leverages for “hawkish” persuasion. This leaves 
Moldova with only one option – “dovish” diplomacy.  
Moldova has also failed to ensure a possible status of armed neutrality. Within 
seventeen years of its independence, it had reduced its military forces to only 6,800 
troops by 2007. And the gross domestic product (GDP) for defense has never been higher 
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than 0.4 percent, which keeps its defense capabilities at a very weak level.76 This budget 
cannot even cover military reforms that, ironically, are approved by the government but 
are impossible to realize without additional funding. From the defense point of view, 
Moldova’s government forces are estimated to be approximately as big and effective as 
Transnistria’s para-military forces.  
From the legal stance, by pledging to respect its own neutrality, Moldova 
successfully avoided adherence to the Russian-driven Collective Security Treaty 
Organization of the CIS. However, at the same time, since 1994 Moldova has been a 
member of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and, in 2006, signed an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO.77 The question then arises 
whether Moldova’s military cooperation with NATO is a violation of its neutrality? Its 
open military empathy with the Atlantic Alliance brings it a lot of criticism, especially 
from Russian and Transnistrian leaders, and makes Moldova’s neutrality less credible.78 
At the same time, the political leaders’ assumption that neutrality would be cheap and 
easy put the country in a very weak security position militarily. Without allies and with 
only a small military, poorly equipped and trained, Moldova is not likely to be able to 
defend itself effectively.  
The biggest external violation of the Republic’s neutrality has been the presence 
of the Russian Federation military on Moldovan territory even after its independence. 
Despite various appeals by the Moldovan government to other states and international 
organizations to persuade Russia to withdraw its troops, there has been no real progress 
so far, only rhetorical clams. Moreover, though Russia has committed itself numerous 
times to the withdrawal, for various reasons it always fails to do so. Even international 
agreements such as at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, whereby Russia agreed (by  
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signature) to pull out its forces by 2002, seem not to be effective. This international law 
violation, which Moldova is unable to defend itself against, appears to be tolerated by the 
entire international community. 
In sum, it results that even though adopting a neutral status seemed to be the best 
solution for Moldova after regaining its independence, the governments ever since failed 
to consolidate this strategy in traditional terms. The failure to get international 
recognition and convince the international community about the seriousness of its 
neutrality, along with the poor domestic policy in this direction, drove Moldova to a point 
where its neutrality, as well as security, is questionable. Not using diplomatic means in 
order to defend its neutrality, not providing tertiary services and not investing in its 
deterrent capabilities seem to be the main reasons for the failure of establishing an 
effective and credible neutral status in Moldova.  
Swinging between the West and the East appears to be a questionable option for a 
weak country like Moldova. This attempt to “free ride” does not seem effective and is 
proved by the Russian Federation’s de facto military occupation and Moldova’s lack of 
other potential allies, a fact that makes the country neither neutral nor secure. Therefore, 
the Moldovan security specifications shall be reviewed in order to ensure an effective 
national security. There is sufficient evidence that the current approach to the Moldovan 
neutral status does not work very well. The Moldovan government, therefore, should 
either revise the current strategy according to the environmental realities, (with 
introducing necessary changes), or they need to switch a new security strategy. In the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, there can be no more “free lunches” in the security 
sector, and regardless of what the national security strategy is, concrete commitments are 
necessary.  
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has argued that after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the notion of 
national security became important. Following long debates over international relations’ 
paradigms, the neo-realism approach of Kenneth N. Waltz and his supporters defined the  
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basic theory of national security in the anarchic international system as a balance of 
power, in which states, by balancing power or bandwagoning, form alliances in order to 
overcome common threats. 
Neutrality used to be an ad hoc strategy that meant certain states were unwilling 
to get involved in certain wars. But at the end of the nineteenth century, the great 
European powers’ imposed permanent neutrality on Switzerland. This new national 
security strategy then began to be chosen by other states and was given international 
recognition at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. Permanent neutrality came to rely 
on the assurance of status quo states to belligerent countries that such a policy is not only 
permanent but also based on using a combination of positive and negative strategy 
components. By this usage, neutral states have attempted to create a credible base for 
their neutrality during peacetime – initially by providing different tertiary services – so as 
to remain neutral during wartime. In addition to peaceful assurances, countries such as 
Belgium before the two World Wars and Norway during World War II have proved the 
necessity of deterrent capabilities to demonstrate that the costs are higher than the 
benefits for belligerents that choose to violate states’ neutral status. These capabilities 
rely therefore on the strategic, economic, and military resources of the neutrals, because 
effective neutrality is not cheap if it is to be seriously protected. 
The Republic of Moldova declared its permanent neutrality in 1994 after a brief 
civil war and pressure from the Russian Federation. This made some analysts think the 
status was imposed by Russia in order to preserve its future imperial ambitions in the 
post-Soviet era. This seems a reasonable assumption since Moldova’s neutrality has 
legalized Transnistria’s de facto independence and Russia’s military presence in Moldova 
for almost seventeen years. On the other hand, some believe that the main reasons for 
such a status were the intention to reintegrate the Moldovan society, to prevent Russia’s 
direct control, and to use this as a tool to affect the Russian troops’ withdrawal from 
Moldova. 
Regardless of the real reasons, the situation was complicated and adoption of 
neutrality appeared to be the best solution. However, the political leaders of Moldova 
have executed this security strategy in a way that makes little sense in both neutrality and 
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security terms. This approach has resulted in a major reduction of the national military 
which places the country in a very poor military security posture. At the same time, 
Moldovan officials played a double game between the West and Russia by maintaining a 
special economic relationship with Russia while empathizing and cooperating militarily 
with NATO. In addition, the internal violations such as Moldova’s military participation 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its failure to protect itself from external violation by 
Russia, through its troops’ continued presence on Moldovan soil, seriously undermine 
Moldova’s neutral status. 
The country makes no effort to protect and assure its continued commitment to 
permanent neutrality. The approaches used by Moldovan political leaders continue to 
harm the country’s national security because of an unclear and poorly defined security 
policy. The small and poorly equipped military is not likely to be able to defend the 
country, while the small size of the internal defense budget and the slow progress within 
the framework of the Partnership for Peace programs can not assist in implementation of 
reforms. While an effective neutral policy is characterized by a combination of positive 
and negative components, Moldova does not seem to have the necessary resources to 
develop such capabilities. It therefore keeps a low profile, making itself look like Norway 
before World War II. As viewed by its critics, these Moldovan courses of action neither 
place the country in a position of de facto neutrality nor offer a secure course of action. 
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III.  EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY: COMPATIBILITY OF 
NEUTRALITY AND ALIGNMENT IN TODAY’S EUROPEAN 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK    
Security is the first condition for development. 
Javier Solana, 2003 
 
A.  THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY  
1.  Introduction 
While the European Union is first of all a community of nation states that share 
similar democratic values, common market economies, and legal norms, it lately also 
began to develop a comprehensive security framework which is aimed at increasing the 
Union’s common security and defense of its interests.79 As considered within the EU, the 
best way to protect the organization’s security is “a world of well-governed democratic 
states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law, and protecting human rights 
are the best means of strengthening the international order.”80  
In exercising its security requirements, the European Union relies on its second 
pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). Since the EU is a multistate organization, member states must 
follow certain common laws, rules, and policies. The second EU pillar includes a military 
dimension and thus resembles, in this aspect, a military alliance, thereby possibly 
undermining the principle of neutrality that some EU members enjoy.  
This chapter will analyze the EU’s accommodation of both aligned and neutral 
states at the same time. Moreover, it will try to determine whether candidate states’ 
security strategies influence their EU integration process. First, the chapter will look 
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briefly at the EU’s comprehensive security concept. Then, it will describe the way that 
some states may join organizations based on a policy of reciprocity, while at the same 
time maintaining a neutrality clause. To illustrate this, the case of Austria will be 
analyzed. Finally, the chapter will examine the way that Latvia, as an aligned state, was 
integrated into the EU and will attempt to determine whether its status of alignment 
helped or made no difference during the integration process. The chapter will conclude 
with a comparison of the role played by the two countries’ security approaches within the 
EU integration process.  
2.  Background: The Roots of the EU’s Comprehensive Security Policies 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Europe was 
faced with a need to dramatically change its security approach. With the “Red evil” gone, 
realist views on security almost lost their relevance in Europe, making room for a review 
of threat perceptions and a new security understanding.81 For those who had expected an 
eventual big conventional war in Europe with the Soviet Union, it was indeed a dilemma. 
The antagonist power had dissolved while huge numbers of West European countries’ 
troops and armaments remained on the continent. The main question that European 
civilian and military elites asked, was, “What now?” 
However, just as Western leaders were celebrating the “defeat” of the Soviets and 
began thinking of future security paths to be taken, the Balkan wars occurred, drawing on 
resources that had begun to seem irrelevant. And that is how Europe made its first 
security “business deal” following the end of the Cold War. The consequences, problems, 
and challenges that resulted from the Balkan tragedy became Europe’s new security 
issues: regional instability, human rights violations, and ethnic cleansing that caused the 
movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Europe. The 
countries of Western Europe, though used to controlling their internal populations, thus 
faced a big problem of incoming people who spoke no local language and had no homes, 
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jobs, local identification cards, and so on.82 These factors contributed to an increase of 
illegal activities – illegal employment, illegal immigration, etc. – and crime, including 
organized crime and drug and human trafficking, and general disorder.83  
Another growing problem for Europeans after the collapse of communism was the 
accessibility of border crossings from Eastern Europe. The poverty produced by the 
Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, in addition to internal conflicts in the 
post-Soviet territories such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, caused people 
to flee as far as possible in search of peace and safety. Therefore, an increasing 
immigration, both legal and illegal, came from Eastern Europe, further aggravating the 
remaining Western forces’ security task. Moreover, weak governments, especially in 
some former Soviet republics, and slow economic progress further encouraged 
immigration to the west.84 With the events of September 11th and the rise of rogue states 
Europeans recognized additional threats: international terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  
These are the factors that were perceived as major security threats and that 
resulted in a new security approach in post–Cold War Europe. As a result, in 2003, the 
EU’s so-called second pillar – the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – was enhanced by a clearly written 
strategic document, the European Security Strategy.  
3.  European Security Strategy: A Comprehensive Security Basis for the 
European Union 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) promotes a comprehensive approach to 
European security, acknowledging that due to the changes in the international system in 
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the 1990s, there was a need to deviate from the pure realist paradigm of security studies. 
The revival of nationalism and ethnic conflicts was beginning to be considered a real 
challenge on the old continent. Problems of regional instability and conflicts, poverty, 
hunger, injustice, and immigration were also serious considerations. Additional 
challenges such as environmental pollution (e.g., global warming) and the spread of 
dangerous diseases (e.g., AIDS) were not ignored either, and, since then, have been 
considered real threats to Europeans’ well-being and thus their security.85 As a document 
explaining the EU security approach, the ESS lists the necessary “tools” for promoting 
CFS/ESD policies. They include strategies for securing the integrity and independence of 
the Union, protecting the common values, and promoting diplomacy and respect for 
human rights outside the EU. The Security Strategy also illustrates an EU framework 
based on solidarity and cooperation within which the member states shall willingly share 
the burden of the common security.  
The European Security Strategy specifies five main threats: terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime. It treats these threats as closely interrelated. For example, in European 
terms, the much overused and ever more diffuse term terrorism marginalizes 
development, alienates people in different regions of the globe, and leads to antagonism. 
Also, regional conflicts may produce failing states, terrorism, and organized crime.86 
There is a circular aspect involved too, as any combination of these threats may logically 
lead to results already mentioned: illegal immigration, poverty, and instability. While it 
does not ignore the negative (i.e., military) security dimension, the ESS stresses the need 
to increase civilian as well as military assets in order to face the new challenges. Because 
these problems are not purely militarily based, it argues that military means alone will not 
be sufficient to counter them.87  
Europe’s comprehensive security depends on a mixture of civilian and military 
resources, but prefers nonmilitary means first. It is based primarily on ensuring the 
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welfare of European nations, and, therefore, spreading democracy and the rule of law and 
diffusing liberal norms are the priority. The European Security Strategy believes that 
friendly neighbors are a key to EU security; thus, the EU enlargement process is 
considered a major tool in changing “the others.”88 The ESS acknowledges a further 
possible need for humanitarian interventions (a Balkans’ lesson), including direct military 
intervention. However, they should be done in strict compliance with international law. 
The EU also considers the United Nations Charter as a main international law, highly 
respects it, and would, moreover, take measures against those who break UN rules.89 
The European Security Strategy sees its security effort as a common goal based 
on multilateralism and contributions and solidarity among the EU member states. 
Cooperation with partner countries and a strict compliance with the UN Charter are 
additional EU priorities. The ESS also stresses the unification of resources as crucial for 
ensuring the EU’s security, which is considered the main condition for development.90  
4.  European Security and Defense Policy’s Military Dimension  
One of the EU’s main security goals is stabilizing the general territory of Europe 
in its widest sense and its glacis. While there is no need at present for actual use of 
military forces within the EU territory, the EU enlargement process brought the Union’s 
borders to some quite unstable regions where ethnic grievances and civil conflicts are still 
virulent.91 The EU is not a military alliance solely, and its European Security and 
Defense Policy does not contain either a “common defense” clause or a “Common 
European Army” concept. Member states are not bound by any mandatory military 
obligation;92 instead, the security concept is based on individual contributions and 
solidarity. It does, however, recognize that military capabilities are important and  
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encourages member states to develop their armed forces at the national level and to 
cooperate militarily within the European Security and Defense Policy framework. 
Interoperability development and EU military cohesion are considered crucial.  
In 1999, at the Helsinki European Council (Helsinki Headline Goal) it was 
decided that the EU had to increase its military capabilities, and the member states 
decided to create a Rapid Reaction Force. These forces were supposed to combine 60,000 
highly professional troops that would be able to deploy within sixty days in necessary 
mission areas. The EU Rapid Reaction Forces have to derive from EU members’ 
contributions, be self-sustaining, and have high operational, intelligence, and logistic 
capabilities.93 Additionally, in 2004, the concept of “EU Battle Groups” was approved; 
these groups shall contain thirteen units of some 1,500 troops that would be able to 
deploy within a range of up to 6,000 kilometers from the EU capital. They ought to be 
capable and prepared to respond to current threats such as terrorism, while their use 
should be exclusively, through crisis-management and peace-support operations outside 
the EU.94 At the same time, the EU does not stand aside, but tries to actively use the 
available means in security matters. This has been proved in independently conducted 
operations such as “Concordia” and “Proxima” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and “Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo.95 Additionally, the 
amount of more than 160 billion Euros that the EU spends on defense each year also 
serves as proof of the EU’s seriousness to the question of security.96 
The military dimension seems to be well supported by the EU public. For 
example, a European poll which included four large EU countries – Germany, France, 
Poland, and the UK – showed that at least 70 percent of Europeans generally believe in 
the armed forces’ roles. Also, 94 percent of questioned Europeans supported the 
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militaries’ role in homeland defense, while 77 percent think the role of the army is to 
prepare and fight wars. At the same time, an average of 70 percent of Europeans would 
support the military for different goals. More than 55 percent (smallest in Germany, 55%; 
biggest in UK, 84%) of EU people have confidence in the armed forces. Moreover, while 
the EU is believed to be primarily an economy-based union, less than 50 percent of 
Europeans think that the economic focus has priority over military power.97 
In sum, the European Union is an organization that after the Cold War took a 
comprehensive approach to security. Both the EU Common Foreign and Security and the 
European Security and Defense Policy were enhanced by the 2003 European Security 
Strategy. The organization stresses the importance of norms’ diffusion and considers that 
peaceful, developed, and friendly neighbors are the key to EU security. The EU pledges 
that a combination of civil-military means is necessary to successfully face the current 
threats and challenges. Europe’s comprehensive security must be based on the UN 
Charter, multilateralism, cooperation, and solidarity among members. Though a positive 
security dimension is advocated in the EU as a primary resort in security matters, the 
encouragement of member states to develop national defense capabilities for direct 
interventions, as stated in the ESS,98 is meant to increase the EU’s military strength over 
time.  
B.  THE EU AND THE QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY: AUSTRIA 
As was noted in Chapter II, historically, each neutral state had its own incentives 
for choosing the status of neutrality. Therefore, it is only logical to view each state 
individually.99 The principles of neutrality are clearly stipulated in international law and, 
one may argue, should be respected in the way they are laid out. However, since the time 
of the Hague Conventions many issues and circumstances within the international system 
have changed dramatically. Moreover, the twentieth century brought the biggest changes 
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in the history of international relations, evidencing all three known types of international 
order: multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. The two World Wars, the Cold War, and 
the post–Cold War period, especially, created deep changes in the political order, 
international relations, foreign policy, and states’ security strategies. Changes in the 
security field, globalization, and the growth of economic interdependence, etc., also 
directly or indirectly affected neutral states. Therefore, it seems clear that the neutrality 
concept itself needs another approach as well. A neutral state today cannot be expected to 
act in a way that was relevant more than a hundred years ago: neutrality might and shall 
be reconsidered, reassessed, and reinterpreted according to the existing changes and 
realities.100  
1.  General Historical Background 
Austria became a neutral state in the aftermath of World War II, in 1955. Its 
merger with Nazi Germany after 1938 meant that the country came under the Allied 
powers during the occupation. While West Germany allied itself with the West and 
NATO, the case of Austria led to a different path in 1954-1955 at the time of possible 
neutralization schemes and pull back plans. Therefore, neutrality on the Swiss model was 
the preferred option of Austrian leaders at the time as a means to regain de facto 
sovereignty and independence. Technically, the Austrian government declared its 
permanent neutrality unilaterally; but, in reality, it was an agreement between the 
Western Powers and the Soviet Union which left Austria no better alternative. Back then, 
Austria’s choice was not between the West and the East, but rather between becoming 
neutral and sovereign or remaining non-neutral and an occupied territory.101 In its 
commitment to neutrality, Austria was not to join NATO to satisfy the Soviets, and 
remain noncommunist to satisfy the West (the latter suited Austria’s interests very well, 
since it had always been an Occidental country). Austria’s neutrality agreement, also  
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known as the Moscow Memorandum, was signed in 1955 in Moscow. Later that year, 
Austria’s government adopted the Neutrality Act, introducing the law in the state’s 
constitution.102  
Though Austria became neutral as a price for being one of the Second World War 
“losers,” its government took its neutral status very seriously. During the entire Cold War 
period, Austria looked forward to enhancing its neutral position, though in reality it, like 
Switzerland laid in the path of a possible Warsaw Pact assault. The Austrians created the 
Bundesheer in the mid-1950s on the Swiss model as a means to uphold neutrality and 
give weight to Austria in the international system of collective security such as it was.  It 
acted as a mediator and “bridge-builder” during the East–West confrontation, played a 
significant role as one of the neutral “peacekeepers” in the UN peace-support effort, and 
rebuilt its economy by taking advantage of trade with both Western and Eastern 
countries. It succeeded in developing aspects of both the positive and negative 
components of neutrality by offering the noted tertiary services while developing its 
deterrent capabilities. It had a peaceful international image and fostered interdependence 
with both the West and East. In addition, the Cold War belligerents’ attitude toward 
Austria was generally positive, all of which seemed to create a reliable stake for Austria’s 
neutrality.  
However, Austria also stressed the military dimension needed to defend its neutral 
status and had quite a powerful defense force, which, though based on the militia system, 
at the end of the 1980s could mobilize up to 260,000 troops within a few days.103 All in 
all, Austria achieved the best results104 imaginable at the time: a Western democratic 
style of living along with a strong economy while at the same time avoiding a revival of 
Nazism, militarism and communism. As a result, the Austrian public believed that their 
status of neutrality was actually the reason for their sovereignty, peace, and prosperity.  
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Indeed, most Austrians continue to believe this fact today in the midst of the rise of 
Austria as an EU nation-state and increasingly as an actor in endeavors of collective 
security and post-conflict reconstruction.105  
2.  The End of the Cold War and a New Political Approach to Neutrality 
The end of the Cold War resulted in two major changes in Austria: a considerable 
weakening of the Eastern trade market on its Soviet pattern (to be replaced in this decade 
with its more vibrant and pleasing successor within an enlarged EU) and the 
disappearance of the major proponent of Austria’s traditional neutrality, the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, the EU (then the European Community) promised new 
economic growth with larger markets, simplified trade conditions and greater 
opportunities. And Austria, in an economic decline (especially the nationalized 
branch)106 at the time, indeed needed European markets, especially as the EU stood ready 
to accept wealthy neutrals,107 making EU integration seem a logical path for Austria to 
take. So, unlike in 1955, Austria now had a choice to make, between joining the EU in 
1995 and becoming richer or maintaining its traditional neutrality and becoming 
economically weaker in the long-term. 
Even today it is hard to imagine that the Austrian populace would “trade” 
neutrality for anything else,108 although the possibility of joining the European Union 
after the Cold War was strongly supported by the ideologically Western Austrian society. 
The local government fully expected strong public opposition to full EU integration if  
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that would undermine Austria’s status of neutrality.109 Therefore, to gain the public’s 
consent to EU integration, the government first analyzed the Maastricht Treaty to 
determine whether it could accommodate a neutrality clause. 
Also, in light of the many international changes, Austrian leaders had to reassess 
the neutrality status itself in order to make it conform to EU rules. They were aware that, 
while most of the Austrian people had probably not thought about the details of the 
neutrality status, the status itself had to remain in effect. Thus, the Austrian officials had 
to actually redefine the term “neutrality” in a way that was acceptable to both the people 
and the EU and that, at the same time, accommodated Austria’s traditional rules and 
beliefs. For the purposes of this thesis, the concept which the Austrian government finally 
decided on is referred to as neo-neutrality.  
Their efforts were rewarded. The government concluded that Austria’s traditional 
concept of neutrality applied overall to matters of war, more specifically, to the 
maintenance of an impartial attitude toward belligerents. Notably, this neutrality did not 
require economic impartiality during peacetime: a neutral state was free to have 
economic relations with any other state or to join any organization, as long as the 
organization did not have military requirements. Moreover, with the dissolution of the 
USSR, there were no obvious belligerents that Austria had to buffer; the current concept 
of war seemed as outdated, therefore, as Austria’s traditional neutrality. At this new stage 
in international politics, neutrality was somewhat marginalized by being reduced to 
military noninterference,110 a step that Austria was unlikely to take, in any case.  
Moreover, after conducting its detailed analyses, Austrian officials realized that 
there were no legal aspects of EU membership that would conflict with Austria’s neutral 
status.111 The EU is, notably, not a military alliance and its charter contains no common-
defense clause; thus member states are not bound by any mandatory military obligations. 
Nothing within the Union was opposed to a status of neutrality, at least in terms of 
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Austria’s new understanding of the term. Furthermore, in contrast to the Cold War 
period, there was no opposing force to Austria’s new neutrality approach;112 the only 
“force” the Austrian government had to convince was the Austrian populace. In light of 
these circumstances, the only reasonable thing to do was to join the EU, and that is 
exactly what Austria, Finland, and Sweden – all neutrals – did on 1 January 1995. They 
became official EU members while at the same time retaining their neutral status. 
3.  Austrian’s Neo-neutrality: Compatibility with European Security 
Policies 
Some might argue113 that Austria’s membership in the EU, which has at least 
some duties under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), means that it has 
forfeited its de facto neutrality. Indeed, the ESDP term common is the opposite of 
individual, which suggests that a status of neutrality would be inherently contradictory. 
Obviously, a state’s individual neutrality conflicts with aspects of the EU’s commonality 
as an institution that includes non-neutral members. And Austria, as a full member of the 
EU, would seem, at least in terms of the EU’s second pillar requirements, to be restricted 
from having independent foreign and security policies. Austria has to comply with the 
principles of the European Security and Defense Policy, has to cooperate with other EU 
members, and has to follow the solidarity clause,114 all aspects that could undermine its 
neutrality. However, this is primarily a first, superficial impression, that is reasonable 
only in terms of conceptually classical neutrality. Nonetheless, to differentiate neo-
neutrality from traditional neutrality, we must take a closer look at the implications of the 
EU’s European Security and Defense Policy.  
To begin, bear in mind that the European Union has a comprehensive approach to 
security. This means, basically, that conventional war is seen as obsolete and that the 
current threats – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
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conflicts, state failure, and organized crime – are being taken into account in a very 
different way. The EU focuses primarily on the civilian dimension when dealing with 
these and other threats. Austria’s neutrality should, therefore, not be a problem, especially 
as the EU-aligned countries have a similar security approach. Overall, EU member states 
reserve the right to retain an individual position in their foreign and security policies.115 
Austria’s position, for example, in disagreeing with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was 
similar to those of Germany and France, although the former is neutral and the latter two 
are aligned countries. 
Neutral states have always advocated diplomatic means to address threats and 
solve conflicts. Austria may be able to make a significant contribution, therefore, to the 
EU’s European Security and Defense Policy by offering its civilian diplomatic expertise 
in efforts to counter Europe’s current threats. Neutrality advocates would hardly be in a 
position to challenge such a contribution, given that neutrals are expected, and even 
inherently inclined, to work to prevent conflicts. Traditionally, the neutral approach has 
always been welcome, whereas nowadays, in many cases, countries that stay away from 
conflicts are seen more as immoral and egoistical.116 It is not likely that Austria would be 
criticized for violating its neutrality by allocating funds to the EU’s efforts, under the 
ESDP, to combat terrorism, organized crime, and WMD proliferation. Nor would 
Austria’s neutrally be questioned if it were to assist a country in its efforts to prevent 
poverty or state failure.  
The same question might be asked about Austria’s contributions – including 
financial resources, expertise, or troops – to peace-support and crisis-management 
operations. Moreover, the threats faced by the EU as a whole are also faced at the 
individual national level. Thus, even if Austria were not in the EU, it would still have to 
use its resources to ensure the security of Austria as a state and a society. In sum, neither 
Austria’s contributions to Europe’s overall security as a member of the EU, nor its own 
security efforts at the national level, pose a danger to Austria’s status as a neutral country. 
Though exercised in different ways, they have the same motivation. Within today’s 
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international system, states face similar threats and challenges. Their mutual cooperation 
is required therefore for their common security, and every reasonable country is likely 
and expected to contribute, regardless of the security strategy that they maintain at the 
domestic level.117 A more difficult question to address is whether these states all have the 
necessary resources for securing the “common good.” Austria does.  
4.  Austrian Military Contribution to the EU  
Because the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) does not have a 
common defense clause, both neutral and aligned countries have an option in respect to 
the terms of their contributions. According to the general ESDP rules, and given its 
neutral status, Austria is free to choose when and how to contribute. But that is not as 
simple as it may appear. As an EU member, Austria has to abide by the solidarity clause 
and be as cooperative as it can in order to receive adequate treatment from other member 
states and maintain its credibility. It would not want to appear, for example, like a “free-
rider,” even militarily, and the EU comprehensive security approach has enough room for 
accommodating lawful military contributions for neutral states.  
When approached from a military point of view, neutrals are encouraged to 
participate in peace-support/conflict-resolution operations. And even during the Cold 
War Austria, like other permanent neutral states, participated in numerous peace-support 
operations: to date, more than 35,000 Austrian citizens have served under the UN flag.118 
In this regard, nothing has changed since the collapse of bipolarity. Indeed, regional, 
especially civil, conflicts have even increased since the 1990s; and the UN continues to 
need “blue berets,” especially well-prepared ones. As long as future missions have a UN 
mandate, neutrals may and shall contribute to global peace, including with military 
troops. For the European Security Strategy favors the UN authority in security matters, 
and Austria’s contribution of troops within the EU under a UN mandate would be 
considered entirely ethical. However, imagining an eventual Austrian contribution absent 
a UN mandate is more difficult. Depending on the situation, Austria would no doubt react 
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differently. Using troops in an antiterrorist operation also should not be considered a 
violation of Austrian neutrality, because “terrorism” is not a specific belligerent or state. 
Rather, it is a tactic to frighten civilians, and is now often perceived as a crime. Helping 
to protect civilians from terrorism would therefore not violate Austria’s neutrality, and, 
depending on the situation, failing to help could even be seen as immoral.  
In preparation for any eventual ESDP missions, Austria continues to maintain its 
military at an equitable level. Though the military is intended primarily to defend the 
homeland, in 1994 Austria joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 
order to increase its interoperability with other European partners.119 Thus, its soldiers 
train with other European countries’ forces so as to achieve a higher level of 
interoperability and enhance their peacekeeping capabilities. Maintaining a reliable 
military force is in keeping, therefore, with both Austria’s interpretation of military 
neutrality and the ESS requirement that EU members enhance their national forces for 
eventual contribution according to the European Security and Defense Policy.120 
Nowadays, when terrorism may be closely related to failed states, organized 
crime, WMD proliferation, and other major threats, and when peacekeeping operations 
could turn into conventional war-fighting, it is difficult to predict how the Austrian 
government would act at different points of time. Such developments would put pressure 
on Austria’s officials and people. They might have to choose between solidarity, 
morality, and cooperation on the one hand, and neutrality on the other. Even today, the 
strengthening of the ESDP military dimension and the EU’s obvious desire to become a 
bigger security actor may lead to some sort of “European common defense.” If this 
happens, either there will have to be special arrangements for the neutral states (which 
will definitely be accompanied by grievances from the allied members) or the latter may 
have to choose between abolishing either their neutrality or their EU membership.  
In sum, though Austria became a neutral state because it had no choice after the 
end of the Second World War, it took its neutral status seriously and observed the 
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traditional requirements of neutrality during the entire Cold War. As the USSR began to 
collapse, however, and the 1990s brought new changes to the international system, the 
Austrian government reassessed the neutrality conditions and came up with a new 
approach. The result was a neo-neutrality that was totally compatible with EU rules, 
which, combined with Austria’s EU aspirations and relatively strong economy, allowed 
Austria to join the organization in 1995.  
Ever since, while continuing to maintain its neutral status, Austria contributes to 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), although primarily by 
civilian/diplomatic means. At the same time, it is training and enhancing its defense 
forces both to protect the country and to prepare for eventual EU peace-support missions. 
Its neutrality was not a challenge to Austria’s EU integration, and its neo-neutral status is 
currently compatible with EU requirements. However, at times, its neutrality may stand 
in the way of Austria’s full solidarity with other member states. By joining the EU 
Austria gained many economic benefits, and today no Austrian doubts that EU 
membership has been good for the country.121 In today’s Europe, where people’s welfare 
is superior to warfare, greater economic strength is Austria’s main achievement in the 
EU, and, in turn, its well established economy can more readily support the security of 
the EU. Therefore, while neutrality made no difference to its integration process, Austria 
enhanced its economic position and now feels very comfortable in the EU. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that future changes – such as the development of 
existing threats or an emergence of new Great Powers states – may have an impact on the 
international system and, consequently, on the EU. This could, in turn, cause a reshaping 
of the European Security and Defense Policy. If such changes occur, it may be difficult 
for Austria to defend its neutral status as an EU member. While this may never happen, it 
is a hypothesis that merits further research, but is not an objective of this thesis. 
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C. EU INTEGRATION OF ALIGNED STATES: LATVIA 
We need to join the EU to live better, but to live at all, we need to join 
NATO 
A Latvian parliamentary, 2002 
 
The European Union (EU) is different from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in many ways. The EU has different specifications and 
requirements for admission, and, technically, integration into the EU does not require 
NATO membership. However, in looking at the enlargement process of both 
organizations after the Cold War, we find that all new Eastern European EU members –
Latvia, for example – were previously admitted to NATO. This fact may say that 
unofficially the way to the EU is via NATO, and in order to analyze this hypothesis we 
will take a closer look at Latvia’s European integration process.  
After regaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Republic of 
Latvia immediately launched a program of integration into the “European family” by 
pledging to join both the EU and NATO at the same time. Interestingly, while working in 
the direction of both simultaneously throughout its entire integration process, Latvia’s 
leaders’ political rhetoric, commitments, and gestures were focused most directly on 
NATO integration, leaving the EU integration process in the shadow. 
That dedication to the NATO process suggests at first glance that NATO 
integration was the Latvian government’s top priority, given that the government 
believed that NATO membership would directly assist the country to integrate into the 
EU. This belief turned to be true despite the fact that NATO membership was granted to 
Latvia only one month earlier than that of the EU.122 The next section will take a closer 
look at the Latvian integration process in an attempt to determine whether or not NATO 
membership actually helps a county gain EU membership. 
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1.  Latvia at a Crossroads: The End of the Cold War and the First Steps 
toward Europe 
After the Cold War ended and Latvia regained independence in 1991, its new 
leadership decided that Latvia must leave its Soviet past behind and integrate into the 
European Community, which is where Latvians had always thought they belonged. To 
accomplish this, Latvia had two major goals: integration into the European Union and 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both were processes that would 
reform Latvia’s political, economic, and social systems. The dual integration would 
require many necessary domestic changes in order to fully democratize the new country, 
develop a competitive liberal market, enhance the independent judicial system, and 
secure the homeland. It would also give Latvia the protection necessary for further 
economic development and a chance to become a true contributor to European 
security.123 However, while pledging Latvia to integration processes in both 
organizations comprised “two sides of the same coin,”124 EU integration was seen as 
more essential for reshaping Latvia’s domestic processes, institutions, and policies, 
whereas NATO membership was considered more critical for achieving the required 
level of national security. Given Russia’s proximity and the existing fear of an eventual 
Russian revival, the Latvians’ political rhetoric and gestures, as well as their domestic 
changes and commitments, clearly showed that NATO membership was Latvian leaders’ 
chief priority. Moreover, while conducting a simultaneous reformation process as a step 
toward EU integration was important, Latvia’s main focus was on NATO membership.  
2.  The Road to NATO: The Political Dimension  
In terms of its politics, Latvia’s desire to join NATO closely followed its 
regaining independence. Historically, the difficulties inherent in being a small state 
caught up in the great powers’ political “games” had brought Latvia under Soviet 
occupation in 1940, under Nazi occupation in 1941, and under renewed occupation by the 
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Soviet Union in 1944 that lasted for the rest of the Cold War. These experiences, 
ingrained in the minds of the Latvian people, resulted in a rush to the West after the 
collapse of USSR. Traditionally anti-Russian, and given the evidence of Russia’s 
interference in the internal affairs of some former Soviet republics at the beginning of the 
1990s,125 the Latvians’ great fear that Russia might stage a “come-back” only increased 
their pro-NATO tendencies. The government’s main focus was on national security, that 
being the only assurance of the further existence of the Latvian nation.126 
With a population of only 2.4 million people, nearly 40 percent of whom were 
Russian-speakers, and thus presumably pro-Russia, inherited from Latvia’s Soviet 
days,127 a destabilized economy, and a weak military, the possibility of NATO 
membership must have sounded absurd to external observers at the time. However, 
Latvian leaders decided to put their efforts primarily into achieving that goal and 
expressed their firm political commitment to NATO values. 
To prove that commitment, the Latvian government maintained an increasingly 
cool relationship with Russia. Thus, the West could see how Latvian politicians kept 
further distancing the country from Russia, by condemning the “Soviet military 
occupation” and constructing a new, democratic society “on the ruins of a totalitarian 
system.”128 In addition, the government gave automatic citizenship only to those non-
Latvians who were born in Latvia before the 1940’s Soviet occupation, and their 
descendants, while imposing a quite difficult process of naturalization, leaving most of 
the Russian-speaking population without citizenship rights. In the field of education, the 
government introduced a law that, in state-supported schools, teaching had to be only in  
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the Latvian language.129 Furthermore, the former World War II soldiers who fought on 
the German side against the Soviets were authorized to conduct certain activities 
commemorating their lost comrades and uniformed parades.130 
All of these actions by the Latvian government were received as a brutal insult by 
both local Russians and the Russian Federation and led to an increase in Russian-Latvian 
antagonism. There were a number of diplomatic conflicts, such as rhetorical accusations 
and the mutual expulsion of diplomats accused of espionage, but the greatest uproar 
occurred when the vice-speaker of Russian Duma (Russian Parliament), Vladimir V. 
Zhirinovsky, declared that Moscow would not bomb Brussels, but Riga, Tallinn, and 
Vilnius.131 Indeed, Russia’s reaction and opposition to Latvia’s domestic policies and its 
NATO aspirations were seen as empirical evidence that proved earlier Latvian “theories” 
of Russia’s continuing imperial ambitions. Moscow literally showed the Latvian people 
that Russia’s interests in the Baltic region had not been given up. This “helped” the 
Latvian populace comprehend that being outside NATO meant falling back into Russia’s 
“sphere of influence.”132 Therefore, the Latvian government reiterated its political 
aspirations and, using all possible political, diplomatic, and domestic means at its 
command, clearly signaled to the West, as well as to Russia, which side it was on.  
Whereas it antagonized Russia, Latvian officials were fully committed to NATO 
values. The organization was considered the symbol of European security, a mechanism 
meant to protect Latvia’s path to democratization, institutional reforms, a market 
economy, and social welfare. Latvia worked hard to make changes in its political, 
economic, and judicial systems according to NATO standards.133 It joined NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace Program and the so-called “Vilnius Group” with other NATO-
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inspired countries and used these forums to enhance PfP cooperation and solidarity and to 
demonstrate full NATO loyalty and commitment.134 It supported NATO’s new “out-of-
area” missions, advocated the great importance of the Trans-Atlantic link, greatly 
supported the role of the U.S. in Europe, condemned international terrorism, and stated 
its willingness to support the common anti-terrorist efforts.135 Latvia continually stressed 
the importance of a secure Europe and its willingness to fully cooperate with its Western 
partners and contribute to NATO’s defense burden.136  
Additionally, Latvian leaders listened to NATO experts and lessened their 
animosity toward Russia. Since any political confrontation between Russia and NATO 
was inadmissible, Latvian politicians began more often to declare their desire to 
cooperate with Russia in a constructive and pragmatic way. They recognized the need to 
cooperate with their Eastern neighbor, especially because a border-delimitation treaty 
between the two countries had not yet been ratified by Russia, something that was highly 
desirable if Latvia was to be admitted into NATO.137 These political approaches to 
NATO, accompanied by domestic transparency and Russia’s imperial attitudes, raised the 
public support for NATO integration, and two years before the accession about 70 
percent of Latvian society (including 33 percent of the Russian-speaking population) was 
in support of full NATO membership.138  
3.  The Road to NATO: The Military Dimension 
In terms of its military, Latvia was not an exception among the post-communist 
states at the initial stage; it began the process toward NATO membership with great 
difficulty. The Latvian Armed Forces had to be reformed from scratch because the Soviet 
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troops destroyed everything that could not be taken to Russia.139 Thus, at the time Latvia 
announced its political orientation toward the West and its desire to become a full NATO 
member, its military was too small, too poorly equipped, and too ill-trained to impress the 
Western partners. It amounted only to some 4,500 active-duty troops for all three 
branches – the army, air force, and navy – half of which were conscripts for a one-year 
term. The army had no tanks and only thirteen armored personnel carriers and some fifty 
artillery pieces. The navy had thirteen patrol craft and a few mine countermeasures ships, 
while the air force had no combat aircraft whatsoever. In addition, throughout the 1990s, 
Latvia’s annual military budget averaged $35 million, about 0.6 percent of the country’s 
gross domestic product.140  
Given the country’s limited military capability, the Latvian government knew 
that, to support a pro-NATO political commitment, urgent military reform was needed. 
Like other East-European countries seeking NATO membership, for Latvia this was also 
a very difficult process. The country had first to change from the old Soviet military 
approach and adapt to NATO standards and then develop a credible and capable 
military.141 This was an especially challenging goal because Latvia’s transitional 
economy was weak, making it hard to choose between defense expenditures and 
important social development programs.  
Aware that it was impossible for Latvia to compete with current NATO partners 
in respect to force size, fire-power, and lethal capabilities, the Latvian military officials 
decided to focus on mobility, decisiveness, and niche-capabilities such as explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD); nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) detection and 
decontamination; military police; peace-support and crisis management; and medical 
teams.142 They began by adopting a “Swedish–Finnish” model defense concept that 
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included the development of small-size rapid reaction units consisting of highly 
professional troops able to quickly mobilize and perform sudden and decisive attacks.143 
Their next step was for the Latvian military to participate in joint military projects 
with Lithuania and Estonia. These three Baltic countries decided on fully mutual 
cooperation as a means to develop more impressive military capabilities. They began 
with the formation of a common Baltic battalion (BALBAT). They then formed a joint 
naval minesweeping squadron (BALTRON), a multinational defense college 
(BALTDEFCOL), and an air surveillance network (BALTNET) compatible with NATO 
standards. However, in order to develop its joint and domestic capabilities, Latvia, like 
the other Baltic States, had to depend initially on foreign military aid. Its military took 
full advantage of the Partnership for Peace programs as well as military assistance from 
partner countries. The United States, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland 
were the main donor countries providing expertise, training, education, and equipment in 
support of Latvia’s armed forces.144 
Additionally, the Latvian government committed to raising its GDP share up to 2 
percent for defense to meet NATO’s minimal standards. Though Latvia’s political leaders 
recognized the difficulty in implementing this commitment,145 they reiterated their 
readiness to contribute to the European security architecture, thereby assuring the 
Alliance of a gradual increase in defense spending.  
Practically speaking, Latvia demonstrated its commitments by joining various 
peace-support operations. Though not yet a NATO member, Latvia participated under 
British and Danish commands in the peace-support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo, while at the same time also contributing to those missions as part of 
BALBAT.146 The Baltic Defense College besides teaching Baltics also provided free 
education and training to military personnel from some partner-countries, for example, 
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Ukraine and Georgia.147 Later, after the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United 
States, the Latvian government supported the Global War on Terror by declaring its 
readiness to assist the U.S. - led operations, “Enduring Freedom” and “Iraqi Freedom.”148  
Despite Latvia’s intense political-military attempt to meet NATO standards, some 
skeptics still argued that that an eventual NATO membership for Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia was very questionable. They argued that the Baltic countries were still too weak 
to equitably contribute to NATO’s burden and while Latvia needed NATO in order to 
become a security recipient, its NATO membership would conflict with Alliance 
interests. The skeptics concluded that NATO did not have strategic interests in the Baltics 
and could not protect the Baltic states in case of an eventual Russian aggression. 
Moreover, the Baltic States’ memberships in the Alliance would only increase Russia’s 
antagonism, they said, and create an undesired security tension between the West and the 
East.149  
However, regardless of what the critics said, Latvia’s political and military hard 
work was rewarded. On 2 April 2004, Latvia, along other six Central and Eastern 
European countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), 
became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.150 
4.  Latvia’s Benefits from NATO Membership toward European Union 
Integration  
Strictly speaking from an institutional point, Latvia’s NATO membership should 
have had nothing to do with its integration into the EU. However, we reach a different 
conclusion when we look at the benefits that Latvia derived from its NATO membership. 
Both the EU and NATO based their post–Cold War agendas on norm diffusion 
from the West to the East. Their basic tenets include assistance in establishment of 
democratic societies, fair state governance, respect for the rule of law, market economies, 
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and respect for human rights. Their admission requirements for candidate states like 
Latvia included a set of radical reforms in the states’ domestic and foreign policies: 
changes in their laws to accord with European standards, a total reorganization from their 
former communist political, economic, and social norms. Therefore, though the EU is 
more an economic “common space” and NATO is more a military alliance, Latvia’s 
reorganization processes were able to accomplish both EU and NATO basic requirements 
at the same time. Moreover, the serious approach that Latvian government took to 
implement Latvia’s commitments toward NATO membership could not be omitted in the 
EU headquarters, especially since the majority of EU member states were also NATO 
members.  
In becoming a full NATO member, Latvia obtained a security guarantee under 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The security assurance clearly positioned Latvia in 
Europe, and thus Russia, Latvia’s historic enemy, despite its interests in the Baltics and 
its imperial ambitions, had to accept the fact that Latvia was no longer within Russia’s 
“sphere of influence.” This was signaled by Moscow, in effect, acknowledging this new 
positioning when it finally agreed to ratify a bilateral border treaty in December 2007.151 
Another sign of Latvia’s new “European status” is evident in the Russian–Latvian 
relationship that developed after 2004. Their former diplomatic conflicts came to an end, 
and the two countries have since maintained purely pragmatic relations based mainly on 
economic interests. Since Russia valued its important political and economic relations 
with other major NATO members, it had no choice but to recognize Latvia as a true and 
equal sovereign state. That change resulted in more foreign investment in the Latvian 
economy. For example, immediately after Latvia’s admission into NATO, the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflow doubled, increasing from $304 million in 2003 to $637 
million in 2004.152 Thus, it proves that the EU knew that the NATO “security blanket” 
would assure further Latvian economic development, one of the EU’s main interests.  
                                                 
151 Russian News & Information Agency “RIA Novosti,” 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20071218/92995784.html (accessed 19 January 2008).  
152 Data provided by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir07_fs_lv_en.pdf (accessed 19 January 2008). 
 60
During the development of its military in order to achieve NATO’s standards, the 
Latvian government also declared Latvia’s permanent support and commitment to the 
European Security and Defense Policy.153 Therefore, the EU officials could clearly see 
that the results pertaining to the Latvian military would be a benefit to the EU’s struggle 
to become a stronger security actor. In addition to Latvia’s troop contribution, the EU 
could rely on strong political support from this non-neutral country, which was extremely 
loyal to the West.   
In sum, we find that Latvia ultimately succeeded in joining both the European 
Union and NATO, despite the deep political, economic, and social problems it faced after 
regaining its independence. Thus, in spite of some skepticism, Latvia achieved its goals 
by making decisive political commitments and proving the seriousness of its intentions. 
Though Latvia’s military may not have entirely met NATO’s requirements and though its 
economy was going through a difficult transition, Latvia was able to convince the West 
of its loyalty and sincere desire to be part of a united Europe. Latvia not only 
demonstrated its willingness to be a full EU and NATO member, but also pushed hard to 
contribute as much as it could to regional and international security.  
While there is no official link between the NATO and the EU integration 
processes, in looking at the Latvian example, it is evident that the processes are closely 
connected. The common EU and NATO enlargement agendas enable candidate states to 
work in two directions at the same time. Latvia, for example, will be just as democratic 
within NATO as it is in the EU. Additionally, since the majority of EU states are also 
NATO members, it makes good sense that a country be accepted into both organizations 
at a relatively similar time. A candidate country like Latvia, especially having an aligned 
status, could benefit both organizations despite the slight difference in their military 
dimensions. Both NATO and the EU seem to clearly signal that intentions, commitments 
and seriousness are much more important than one’s real capabilities, and other countries 
eager to join the “European family” must bear this in mind.  
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D.  CONCLUSION  
The European Union has developed a comprehensive security approach to five 
main threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, 
state failure, and organized crime. It also takes into consideration such destabilizing 
issues as human rights violations, poverty, immigration, the spread of diseases, etc. The 
EU considers these threats and challenges interrelated and in order to face them relies on 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was reinforced in 2003 by the 
European Security Strategy. 
The ESDP does not contain a “common defense” clause and depends on member 
states’ cooperation, contributions, and solidarity whereas the European Security Strategy 
is based on a combination of civil-military means prioritizing the civilian/diplomatic 
dimension over the military one. Security interventions are intended to be multilateral 
and must observe international law stipulations and the UN Charter. Because of the 
existing threats, even the military missions are expected to have a form of peace-support 
or crisis-management operations. Such an approach allows neutral states to integrate into 
the EU and, along with their aligned partners, participate in shaping the European 
security architecture.  
When Austria applied for EU integration, the only issue needing clarification was 
its neutrality, since otherwise, a democratic, liberal, and economically strong Austria was 
ready to integrate. Therefore, after reassessing its status of neutrality, Austria was able to 
integrate into the EU while maintaining a neutrality clause. While supporting the ESDP 
primarily through civilian means, Austria can also contribute troops, since the existing 
interventions have a moral, peace-supportive intent. It also continues to maintain a 
relatively strong military that should be relevant for protection of its sovereignty as well 
as for contributions to the ESDP. Though critics advocating traditional neutrality may say 
that by being an EU member Austria has de facto lost its neutral status, post–Cold War 
changes have been applied to neutrality as well. The new Austrian approach to neutrality 
is completely compatible with the EU legal principles for the time being; however, if 
specific changes happen in the international system in the future, and clear belligerents 
appear, it may press Austria to choose between the EU membership and neutrality. 
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Latvia, which also had EU integration aspirations after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, had a different situation than that of Austria. First of all the country was in a 
difficult political, economic, social, and military situation at the beginning of the 1990s 
and, therefore, lacked sufficient resources to accomplish the EU requirements. It thus 
chose to use its aligned security status and focused on NATO integration. Latvia 
convinced the West to allow it into European institutions by showing a strong political 
commitment. It began a “diplomatic” war with Russia and supported NATO and the EU 
in every possible way, thus demonstrating its total loyalty to the Occident. Additionally, 
Latvia developed a small but mobile and capable military, which was used to contribute 
to different peace-support and anti-terror operations. Their political-military alignment to 
NATO was also noted by the EU, and counting on eventual economic progress after 
obtaining NATO’s security cover, Latvia was admitted to NATO and the EU at the same 
time.  
Thus while neutral Austria could attract the EU with a well-established 
democratic society, legal bases, and a strong economy, Latvia offered it full political and 
military alignment and loyalty to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially NATO. These 
two examples illustrate that states theoretically could integrate into the EU regardless of 
their security strategies. However, in large organizations such as the EU, neutrality can be 
an advantage; therefore, neutral countries need to be of a relatively high value to the 
organization in order to be accepted. As Austria proves, states with a high degree of 
multilateral capabilities can fairly easy integrate into the EU, especially in absence of any 
protesting belligerents. It is, however, questionable whether weaker states can do the 
same. As Latvia illustrates, countries with a lower level of development may need higher 
efforts in order to be considered for EU accession.  
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IV.  THE KEY ACTORS INFLUENCING THE REPUBLIC OF 
MOLDOVA’S EU INTEGRATION PROCESS: REALITIES AND 
OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ultimately, the EU has the sole power to either accept or reject Moldova’s 
membership; thus, in theory, Brussels is the sole authoritative source with which the 
Moldovan government should be concerned. It is Moldova and the EU, as bilateral 
partners, which must agree on the terms, conditions, and process of the accession. 
However, in this twenty-first-century, globalized world, there are other players that can 
enable or obstruct political-economic processes. And in Moldova’s attempt at EU 
membership, the Russian Federation is also a key actor. 
In the area that was formerly the Soviet Union, the ambitious Russian Federation 
continues to have a significant effect on the fate of its former “partners,” and Moldova is 
no exception. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Moldova became a victim of 
Russia’s brutal foreign policy; and it has suffered ever since from Russia’s hegemonic 
ambitions which are aimed at keeping Moldova within its sphere of influence.  
This chapter will evaluate the views, attitudes, and policies of the EU and Russia 
toward Moldova’s EU membership aspirations and analyze how these two actors’ 
positions have affected Moldova’s progress so far. Because Russia acts to obstruct the 
process, its involvement will be analyzed first. This chronology will provide a foundation 
for understanding Moldovan reality under Russian dominance and the reasons for its 
actions. It is not meant, however, as a defense of the Moldovan government, which is 
solely responsible for its own mistakes during this process.  
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the actual circumstances in 
Moldova, using the lessons learned by Austria and Latvia in their EU integration 
processes (described in Chapter III), while taking into account the EU’s and Russia’s 
positions. We will then describe the options that Moldova has in its attempt to integrate 
into the EU as fast as possible and at the lowest possible cost.  
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B. RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARD MOLDOVA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
MOLDOVAN EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION PROCESS  
1. Russia and Moldova: The General Context 
Officially, the relations between Russia and the Republic of Moldova have been 
exercised according to basic international principles. Both countries are, by right, both 
sovereign and independent and, since the fall of the Soviet Union, have had good bilateral 
relations, maintained diplomatic missions in the partner state, signed numerous treaties 
and agreements, and are part of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Officials of both countries conduct both official and unofficial visits, send and 
receive congratulating letters on different occasions, and say nice things about each other. 
Moreover, Moldova’s leaders consider Russia a strategic political and economic partner 
and, in their 2001 pre-election campaign, the ruling Communist Party even pledged to 
join the Russia–Belarus “union.”154 Russia supports the sovereignty, independence, and 
integrity of the Moldovan state and its neutral strategic status and European integration 
aspirations. At least, that is what the Moldovan President, Vladimir Voronin, believes.155 
However, this is the “official” public policy. In reality, Russia’s Moldovan policy 
is based on its imperial ambitions and its intent to keep Moldova within the Russian 
“sphere of influence.” After the dissolution of the USSR and the shock of its lost empire, 
Russia initiated a new policy toward some of its former “sister-republics,” which the 
Kremlin calls the “near-abroad.” Thus, Moscow sought to keep its strategic interest in 
these regions. Though it lost its global importance almost “overnight,” the Kremlin 
attempted to at least impose its hegemony and importance on the post-communist states 
and on the former USSR states in particular. In doing so, it has used both soft and 
coercive measures to ensure greater control over the countries of interest. Moldova was 
no exception. In fact, it was the first country in which Russia used its most coercive tool, 
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the Russian military.156 Ever since, Russia has used two primary means to ensure its 
influence in Moldova: Moldova’s Transnistrian conflict and its economic dependence.  
2. Russia and Moldova’s Transnistrian Conflict  
As we showed in Chapter II, in 1992, Russia got involved in Moldova’s internal 
affairs by supporting militarily the rebellion in Moldova’s Transnistrian region. It was the 
first Russian “out of area” military intervention to test the legitimacy of Russian regional 
power, and later proved to be the turning point in Russian post-Soviet foreign policy.157 
After escalating the conflict, Russia “negotiated” a peace agreement, based on “Russian 
terms,” with the Moldovan government, thereby effecting a de facto legitimization both 
of Transnistria as a “Russian satellite” and of the Russian military presence in Moldova.  
Ever since, the Russian Federation has supported the Transnistrian regime – 
politically, economically, and militarily. To show their support for the region, Russian 
political leaders have conducted visits to Transnistria, though without the Moldovan 
government’s consent.158 Russia supplies the rebel area with cheap energy, makes special 
economic arrangements for the region, and provides large amounts of aid. Russian and 
Transnistrian political parties now have mutual cooperation agreements, and a large 
percent of the Transnistrian populace has been granted Russian citizenship.159 Russia’s 
extensive support has been seriously criticized by the international community, which 
raises the question: Why would Russia risk its image in the international arena for 
Transnistria? In this regard, it is worth reiterating that Russia continues to have strategic 
interests in Moldova, which it has never denied. Among its various incentives for 
supporting Transnistria, two Russian interests predominate.  
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One concerns Moldova’s geographic position and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) enlargement to the East of the European continent since the end 
of the Cold War. After its loss of control over Central and Eastern European countries in 
the late 1980s, Russia saw how the new political leaders in those states rushed to seek 
NATO membership. When the first post–Cold War NATO enlargement occurred in 
1999, Russia had good reason to believe that the process would continue and was not 
“disappointed” when seven more countries joined the alliance in 2004.160 NATO had 
already penetrated the former USSR with its admittance of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Thus, the Kremlin openly expressed its grave concern about NATO’s 
enlargement,161 and the incentives for retaining control of remote areas far from its 
borders increased considerably. 
Consequently, Russia declared that the NATO expansion was a threat to its 
national security. Traditionally, Russia had located its defenses as far as possible from its 
borders. After the Cold War, therefore, it would have preferred at least a circle of 
nonaligned states around its frontiers.162 This possibility vanished: NATO was already at 
its borders. Thus, the Kremlin attempted to hold onto whatever control over territories 
that it could.  
The conflict in Transnistria had various causes, and there were various options for 
settling it if it had not suited Russia’s purposes to maintain the problem. While a 
continuous armed conflict was undesirable for Russia, a total settlement was not an 
option either. The problem had to be prolonged because then a cheap and legitimate 
Russian political and military presence would be required in the region. By maintaining a 
peaceful antagonism between Moldova and Transnistria, Russia managed to continue its 
military control of the region and achieve a “moral” peacekeeping status in the eyes of 
the international community. Moreover, according to the conflict resolution format “5 + 
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2,”163 Russia would be the main power in a conflict settlement. It could solve the 
problem when and how it wants, leaving little chance for the other actors to get involved: 
a stalemate that gave the green light for the implementation of Russian plans in the 
region.  
Therefore, by keeping its troops in Transnistria Moscow tried to stop an eventual 
expansion of NATO in a South-Eastern European direction. Especially taking into 
account Ukraine’s and Georgia’s recent intentions to join the alliance, Russia basically 
reserved itself an island where it could later increase its military presence in case of 
necessity. Given the loyalty of Transnistria and its insubordination to Moldova’s central 
authorities, it would indeed be much easier, therefore, for Russia to enhance its military 
presence in Transnistria rather than attempting to put its forces in a neutral Moldova.  
Transnistria’s economic status was another reason that Russian wanted to keep 
control of the region: it holds approximately one third of Moldova’s heavy industry. Its 
freedom from central control enables Transnistria to produce and trade according to its 
own “norms.” Known as a “Black hole in Europe,” the region has been a “safe heaven” 
for illegal money laundering, criminal business, drugs and human trafficking, and other 
illicit activities that provide income for certain people.164 Additionally, most 
Transnistrian businesses are owned by influential people from Russia, and because this 
ownership was achieved during unlawful “privatization” in the region, it is considered by 
Moldovan authorities as illegal property. In case of a conflict resolution and Moldova’s 
reunification, the rights of business owners in Transnistria risk being lost. Thus, there are 
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Russian political circles. Their personal economic interests in Transnistria are so 
important to some individuals in Russia that this has been included as an official issue on 
the negotiating agenda between Moscow and Chisinau.165 
These are the two primary reasons that Russia apparently considers more than 
enough to ignore the numerous Moldovan appeals for Russian military withdrawal. They 
also appear to be sufficient reasons for Moscow to disregard international requests to 
observe international law and respect Moldova’s independence and sovereignty. After all, 
why should the Russians leave? With its military on the ground and its people in all 
branches of the government, the economic sector, and the security services, the Kremlin 
has complete control of Transnistria. Moreover, Moscow does it so “successfully” that it 
is supported by the local population and, of course, by the small number of individuals 
who “officially” hold power and fill their pockets from the illegal activities in this 
problematic area. By this norm-breaking behavior, Russia tests the West’s patience by 
committing violations of democratic values under its very nose.166      
3.  Russia’s View on Moldova’s Permanent Neutrality  
As we said in Chapter II, some analysts believe that Moldova’s neutral status was 
imposed by Russia in 1992 in order to create a buffer between the emerging pro-NATO, 
so-called “New Europe,” states and Russia’s borders. Whether this is true or not, the 
question of Moldova’s permanent neutrality seems to be very important to the Russian 
Federation. Just as in the case of Austria in 1955, it appears that Russia is the country 
most interested in Moldova’s neutrality, more interested even than Moldova itself, and 
perhaps it has reasons to be. 
Historically, Russia has tried to organize its defenses as far as possible from its 
geographic borders. This strategy was used during the time of Tsarist Russia, during the 
Soviet time, and the time since the fall of the USSR is no exception. As any country with 
                                                 
165 One of the obligations the Moldovan government committed to execute in return for Moscow’s 
military withdrawal is recognizing the legacy of Russian-owned business in Transnistria. See Vladimir 
Socor, “Voronin’s Six-Point Plan to Putin: a Calculated Risk,” 2. 
166 Edward Lucas, “The Black Hole that Ate Moldova,” Euro Journal, (3 May 2007): 
http://eurojournal.org/more.php?id=229_0_1_0_M5, 1, (accessed 18 February 2008). 
 69
hegemonic experience, Russia definitely prefers to have the territories on its frontiers 
occupied, suzerain, and loyal, or at least neutral. Aware of its bad reputation after the end 
of the Cold War because of its poor treatment of its former allies, the Kremlin preferred 
to have neutral, nonaligned, and/or militarily weak states in Central and Eastern 
Europe.167 At the same time, it continued to try to find allies in the neighborhood. And 
while gaining the loyalty of ex-Soviet republics such as Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan, it has never obtained a favorable opinion from Moldova. After 
allowing the Moldovans to refuse to sign the CIS Collective Security Treaty on a neutral 
basis,168 it was obvious that the Kremlin agreed to and supported a neutral Moldova. 
Probably Moscow had learned the lessons of the Cold War. Instead of forcibly aligning 
the anti-Russian Moldova to it, the Kremlin believed that a neutral Moldova would better 
fit Russia’s security interests. An ally that did not really want an alliance with Russia 
would require greater resources for keeping the status quo. In addition, it could realign 
with the West after any election, while a neutral Moldova would refrain from joining any 
alliance on its own, at no cost to Moscow. Therefore, through Russian lenses only a 
neutral Moldova would provide guarantees that NATO would not expand in that part of 
Europe.    
Acknowledging Russia’s interest in Moldova, it appears that it will have no 
serious concerns, since Moldova is already a neutral country. The Kremlin, however, 
appears not to trust the Moldovan willingness to keep this security status, and it probably 
has reasons not to do so. In Chapter II we explained how Moldova’s government has 
failed to implement constitutional stipulations of neutrality which would make the 
country de facto neutral. So far, the actions of the Moldovan authorities have 
demonstrated that they do not take seriously its neutrality and are only temporarily 
maintaining this strategic status.  
Moldova is not neutral in its foreign policy. It has committed troops to the 
military campaign in Iraq and is an old member of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program, having signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2006. Moreover, 
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in 2007, NATO opened an information and documentation center in Chisinau, which is 
meant to familiarize the Moldovan public with the security agenda of the North-Atlantic 
alliance.169 Russia, which looks at neutrality more in classical terms, is concerned with 
the approach to that status taken by Moldova, especially because all the “violations” are 
in favor of the West, with an evident stress on NATO. Moreover, the fact that the 
government has not kept the Moldovan public informed and educated on security 
matters170 may signal that the political elites do not want public support to develop for 
neutrality. If this is the case, then Russia must conclude that the Moldovan officials do 
not want the populace to oppose an eventual abolishment of the neutral status. Moldova’s 
European Union integration intentions vis-à-vis the “EU–NATO tandem” stereotype and 
the pro-Western orientation of the majority of the Moldovan public only enhance 
Russia’s suspicions regarding the reality of Moldovan neutrality. Therefore, to keep 
Moldova within its orbit, Russia has reduced the question of Moldova’s permanent 
neutrality to two main powerful Russian leverages: the Transnistrian conflict and 
Russia’s economic relations with Moldova.  
a.  The Transnistrian “Tool” for Ensuring Moldovan Neutrality 
While Moldova’s neutrality is the main assurance of Russia’s influence, 
Russia uses the power of its involvement in the Transnistrian issue to ensure that 
Moldova’s neutral status is according to Russian “standards.” Moldova’s permanent 
neutrality is the main condition for the Russian troops’ withdrawal from Transnistria, and 
Moldova believes only the Russian assistance in settling the problem will lead to the 
country’s reintegration. The Kremlin makes it clear that it will not accept Moldova’s 
current status of neutrality as a condition for ending the conflict: it seeks “guarantied  
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neutrality.”171 Only real guaranties that Moldova will not abolish this status – and thus 
join NATO – would make Russia pull out its troops and facilitate the conflict’s 
resolution.  
The reality of the Transnistrian conflict leaves no doubt that the key to its 
resolution lies only in Moscow. If before, Russia played only a tacit role in this problem, 
lately the involved actors “play” openly. Especially by its latest position on the Kosovo 
debate172 and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,173 Russia no longer 
denies its extreme interest and influence in Transnistria. As mentioned, Moscow controls 
the area entirely, has troops on the ground, and is the main “guarantor” in the “peace-
settlement process.” The fact that for seventeen years it has ignored the international 
community’s calls to withdraw its troops and its support of the Transnistrian regime 
shows that no international actor is able to force this on Russia. Therefore, the Moldovan 
government apparently has no chance of solving the Transnistrian conflict without taking 
into account Moscow’s interests.174  
This position has been repeatedly stated and reiterated by both Moldovan 
and European officials. When the Communist party came into power in Moldova in 2001, 
it began bilateral negotiations with the Kremlin outside the official conflict resolution 
format. In 2007 alone, the presidents of Russia and Moldova met four times in an attempt 
to reach a compromise.175 But since Russia has literally everything it wants in 
Transnistria, Moldova’s task is to come up with something new that can be offered in 
exchange for Moscow’s willingness to solve the Transnistrian issue. Neutrality is one of 
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the few possible options. And lately it seems that the neutral status has changed from 
being merely a Moldovan security strategy to being a “trademark” for Transnistrian 
conflict resolution where a “guarantied” neutral status for Moldova is a high priority for 
Russia.  
b. Economic Dependence as a Tool for Ensuring Moldova’s 
Neutrality 
Today, Moldova is totally dependent economically on Russia. This 
dependency began in the early 1990s, immediately after Moldova regained its 
independence. Either laziness or the inability of the Moldovan elite to reorient Moldovan 
trade westwards led to its growing dependence on markets within the territory of the 
former Soviet Union. At the time, it was possibly the best decision, since economic 
channels between Moldova and its ex–Soviet partners were already established. But 
while CIS markets were the best solution during that initial period, the central 
government failed to conduct effective reforms and gradually change the economic 
vector toward the West. This was necessary at least for a diversification and balancing of 
trade in order to avoid an eventual dependence on a specific market. The Moldovan elite, 
however, failed to do so, and by 1998, 72 percent of Moldovan exports were CIS 
oriented, with 62 percent in Russia only.176 The lesson about the consequences of such 
dependence should have been learned in 1998 when Russia, though unwillingly, almost 
bankrupted Moldova. Because of the so-called “Russian financial crises” at the time the 
Moldovan national currency fell considerably and exports and imports declined, while 
cash for already exported goods was not received. The Russian crises also doubled 
Moldova’s foreign debt in terms of its gross domestic product (GDP) and created a great 
deal of frustration over the Moldovan economy.177  
The lesson was not taken seriously, however, and Moldova’s economic 
dependence continued. This time Moscow acted consciously, imposing in March 2006 a 
ban on Moldovan agricultural exports, especially on alcoholic products. Interestingly, the 
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sanctions declared by the Russians on a purely economic basis178 came after a series of 
political moves that illustrated a more serious Moldovan pro-Western commitment. First, 
it was the Moldovan refusal in 2003 to sign the so-called “Kozak Memorandum,” a 
document designed by Moscow to resolve the Transnistrian conflict according to the 
Russian point of view.179 Then, a little later that year, the Moldovan government 
intensified its rhetoric regarding its intention to integrate into the European Union, 
followed by the signing of the EU-Moldova European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
Action Plan.180 Also, in 2006, when the ban was imposed, Moldova signed an Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO181 and for the first time conducted a military 
NATO/PfP exercise, Cooperative Longbow/Lancer 2006, on its own territory.182  
Another cause of Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia is its lack of 
energy sources, which means it is dependent on Russia’s oil, gas, and coal resources. 
Throughout the sixteen-year-period of its independence, Moldova has failed to develop 
reliable energy resources, and has been forced, therefore, to accept Russian conditions for 
its energy imports. Being economically weak, Moldova cannot afford real-market prices 
for Russian gas like other European countries. Instead, it must negotiate lower prices with 
Moscow, with a presumably negative political effect for Moldova. Additionally, its 
inability to pay its bills on time to the largest Russian state-owned energy company, 
Gasprom, has forced Moldovan officials to appeal to the barter trade, offering shares of 
key Moldovan state-owned enterprises to the Russian giant. This course of action 
gradually gave Gasprom control of the main Moldovan thermo-energetic agent, 
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Moldovagaz.183 By 2000, this approach had almost turned Moldova into a voluntary 
suzerainty, when the then prime minister, Braghis, “suggested to the Russians the idea of 
leasing a military base in Transnistria in exchange for free gas supplies.”184 Though an 
official legalization of Russian troops in Moldova was avoided, a large share of the 
country’s economy is now owned legally by different Russian economic agents. The 
government, however, “sells” this reality to the Moldovan public by calling Russia 
“Moldova’s biggest investor.”185 
For economic reasons, there are enough Russian interest groups that prefer 
the status quo in Moldova, and keeping Moldova neutral is insurance against the strict 
European laws and regulations. By launching a so-called “wine war,” Moscow tried 
empirically to test the hypothesis of Moldova’s dependency on Russia. This theory turned 
out to be right: the Moldovan government had no better alternative than to beg Moscow 
to lift the ban. Given those circumstances, it is hard to imagine an equal relation between 
the two countries, when Moscow has all the power to set the “rules of the game,” thus 
forcing the Moldovan elite to accept them. 
In sum, we can conclude that a permanent status of neutrality for Moldova 
is extremely important to Russia. Having its own considerable interest in the region, 
Russia uses its political, economic, and military leverage to keep Moldova as “neutral” as 
possible. The Transnistrian conflict and Russia’s economic leverage are used to keep 
Moldova within the Russian sphere of influence. Moldova’s desire to solve the 
Transnistrian stalemate places the country in a very difficult position in the negotiation 
process with Russia, since there is little left that would interest the latter.  
This path of negotiation could lead the Moldovan officials into a Russian–
Transnistrian trap. And while trying to reintegrate the country, the Chisinau leaders may 
make Moldova a “hostage” of Transnistrian conflict resolution. This is because, in 
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Russian terms, the neutrality guaranties shall be granted either internationally by 
powerful actors in the region or internally by giving veto powers to Transnistria in the 
future reunited Moldovan political process. In both cases Russia would reserve the 
possibility to control Moldova’s policy. In the first case, Russia would have the right to 
get involved in Moldova’s security affairs as one of the “guarantors”; while in the 
second, it could veto, through Transnistria, any central decision that did not serve its 
interests.186 
No doubt even in a reintegrated Moldova, Russia will continue to control 
its Transnistrian “satellite.” In that case, Russia will basically restrict Moldova’s ability to 
conduct its own internal, foreign and defense policy and, from controlling only 
Transnistria today, it may be able to control the entire country of Moldova in the future.  
Though officially Russia is concerned only with NATO’s eastward 
expansion and does not mind Moldova’s intentions of joining the EU, Russia’s 
traditionally holistic view of the West and the high level of pressure on Moldova’s 
guaranteed neutrality should concern Moldovan officials. Endorsing a neutrality policy 
according to Russian desires may distance Moldova from the EU; historically, the West 
and Russia have not been able to operate in the same region. The Russian presence in 
Transnistria has maintained Moldova’s unstable image in Europe, thus keeping away EU 
partners and investors. It has facilitated its low economic level, political immaturity, and 
unattractiveness. Russia literally blackmails Moldova with the Transnistrian problem and 
uses it as its main tool for keeping Moldova under its influence. By joining the EU 
Moldova would have to obey the EU laws, rules, and policies. It would have to follow the 
EU political, economic, and security vectors. It would have to stick to the solidarity 
clause and serve the Union’s interests and values, which are often different from those of 
Russia. Today, having spent billions to ensure its control over Moldova, why would 
Russia change this? Russia does not trust Moldova’s neutrality, but why should Moldova 
believe in the effectiveness of the model of neutrality suggested by Russia? All in all, we  
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might conclude that by attempting to solve its problems according to the Russian recipe, 
instead of becoming a true European country, Moldova risks being dragged down to the 
Transnistrian level.187  
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S VISION VS. MOLDOVA’S INTEGRATION 
INTENTIONS  
1. Moldova and the European Union: Historical Background 
Throughout their history, the relationship between the European Union and 
Moldova has been a series of ups and downs. With the end of the Cold War, many former 
Communist countries viewed the European Union as a welcome alternative to their dark 
past. Immediately after regaining its independence, Moldova had many incentives for 
reorienting to the West, especially after being struck by Russia via the Transnistrian 
issue. The country was newly independent, it had just experienced a military conflict, it 
had been occupied militarily by Russia, and it had de facto lost of a portion of its 
territory. Logically speaking, at the beginning of the 1990s, Moldova had possibly more 
reasons than all the other ex-Soviet countries to seek European integration. The EU, 
however, had remained silent during the Transnistrian crises and along with other 
Western institutions allowed Russia’s aggression in Moldova in 1992. This left little 
room for trust in the eyes of the Moldovan people. But Moldova had little other choice: 
though not highly reliable, in contrast to Russia, the EU at least did not keep undesired 
military troops in Moldova. Thus, the Moldovan officials began to look for closer 
relations with the EU.  
On 28 November 1994, Moldova signed a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) with the EU, in which Moldova committed to conduct reforms toward 
democratization, market liberalization, judicial system enhancement, and domestic 
institutional transformations.188 In 1995, Moldova was the first ex-Soviet state to join the 
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Council of Europe,189 and it continued to seek other frameworks for tightening its 
bilateral relations with the EU. In Moldova, these early steps were believed to be the 
foundation for an eventual Moldova’s EU accession, especially after the first post–Cold 
War EU enlargement wave in 1995. The EU’s announced intention to incorporate new 
members and the quick incorporation of the neutral states in 1995 might have led the 
Moldovan government to the impression that a simple willingness could be enough to 
bring a state into the EU. 
A simple desire to access the attractive European “club of the rich” was not 
enough, however. In this regard, Russia could be blamed for pressing the Moldovan 
government to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus distancing the 
country from the EU, but a closer look at the developing EU-Moldova framework 
suggests there were other reasons as well.190 The EU lost trust in Moldova’s true 
“European choice” largely because of Moldova’s “double-standard” policy toward Russia 
and the West. Even more important were Moldova’s weak practical achievements on its 
commitments to the EU. It is also important to recall here that, at the time Moldova had 
achieved a high level of political and economic partnership with Russia but was very 
slow in domestic liberal reforms, while its pro-Western course was mainly rhetorical. 
The economic crises in Russia in 1998 and their impact on the Moldovan 
economy alerted some Moldovan politicians, however, to the fact that, at least in terms of 
economic stability, Russia was not a reliable partner. As a result, Chisinau began to seek 
alternative routes to the already disappointed European Union.191 The initial goal was to 
become a full member of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE), most of 
whose members were candidates for EU accession. This initiative seemed a good idea, 
since membership in SPSEE would change Moldova’s status from a CIS country to a 
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South Eastern European one. The European “brand” was needed in order to cut its 
association with Russia and thus gain more support from EU member states. If the plan 
worked, Moldova could use SPSEE as a link to eventual acceptance as a candidate for the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and thus possibly an associate EU candidate 
status, which would have brought the country much closer to eventual EU 
membership.192 
However, the political crises and radical changes of Moldova’s government 
during 1999–2000 prevented Moldova from fully achieving its earlier goals.193 The new 
Moldovan communist government’s antagonism to Moldova’s “Europeanization” was 
naturally not greeted with excitement by the West. Therefore, despite the fact that 
Moldova succeeded in becoming a full member of the SPSEE in June 2001, in contrast to 
the Baltic and Balkan states, its application to the SAP process was denied.194 This was 
not only a disappointing result for Chisinau’s earlier expectations, but also Europe had 
not expected the Moldovan public to elect a communist government. Thus, the 
Communist Party election in Moldova initiated a phase of cooler relations between 
Moldova and the EU. 
For the next few years, the EU could only watch the developments in Moldova, 
which, under communist rule, were intended to forge a closer friendship with Russia. 
Nonetheless, even the communists were disappointed when Moldova was not invited to 
be part of the Russian-led Euro-Asian Economic Community (EAEC) and the Economic 
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after the CIS summit in Yalta, the President of Moldova called CIS a “distrustful, 
ineffective and unstable club of states” and announced Moldova’s irreversible vector 
toward European Union integration.195  
2.  The European Union’s Neighborhood Policy: Effects in Moldova 
In 2003, the European Union launched a new initiative, the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a plan that was meant to create special relations with 
neighboring states in order to avoid the creation of any barriers, mistrust, or confusion 
between the EU and its eastern and Mediterranean neighbors.196 The policy aimed at 
facilitating the promotion of EU principles, norms, and values outside the Union’s 
borders. In exchange for simplified political and economic relations and financial aid, the 
EU’s neighboring countries were basically requested to conduct domestic reforms that 
would enhance their political, economic, and judicial systems. This new policy appeared 
to be beneficial to the EU and to its neighbors at the same time. According to its security 
and defense policy, the neighboring states could use the EU’s funds and support for their 
own development while the Union would obtain a ‘belt’ of politically, economically, and 
socially stable countries. Given these basics, according to which everyone is supposed to 
gain, the assumption is that there will be satisfaction on both sides. The reality proves to 
be slightly different, however.  
One of the main negative issues that some neighboring states find in the European 
Neighborhood Policy is that it does not promise EU membership. The Republic of 
Moldova is one of those countries. Though in 2003 Moldova made a radical change in its 
foreign policy and has reiterated its deep desire to become a full member of the EU, such 
a future has never been promised by the EU officials. But neither has an eventual EU 
membership been denied to Moldova. As a result, a noticeable gap was created between 
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Moldova’s and the EU’s desires and abilities. Nonetheless, EU officials have warmly 
welcomed Moldova’s initiative for integrating into the EU and promised to assist the 
country to advance toward EU standards.  
The EU supports Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity according to 
international law and Moldova’s neutral status; thus it condemns the presence of Russian 
troops on Moldovan soil. The EU believes that the unsettled Transnistrian conflict is the 
main obstacle to Moldova’s development and a challenge to its strategic pro-European 
direction. Therefore, it declared that it was ready to assist Moldova in its European 
transformation process. Probably because of its awareness of Moldova’s difficult 
situation under Russian pressures, the EU does not say much about its interest in 
Moldova’s military capabilities under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
In regard to the Transnistrian problem, however, it does stress the need for a secure 
environment. 
Therefore, in February 2005, after intensified bilateral negotiations, the two 
parties signed the EU–Moldova European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan which 
commits the EU to assisting Moldova’s development efforts.197 The action plan was 
intended to be operable for a period of three years, during which the Moldovan 
government was to make a vast number of political, economic, and social reforms under 
the EU supervision. Using this new framework, Moldova hoped for special economic 
relations with the EU, the Union’s assistance in resolving the Transnistrian issue, and 
facilitation of the freedom-of-movement preferences of the Moldovan people within EU 
territories. While some say that the EU–Moldova ENP Action Plan is too vague and does 
not stipulate clear “rewards” for conducting domestic reforms,198 the plan is a unique  
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chance for Moldova to demonstrate its change of mind and its eagerness to become a true 
European state. After so many mistakes in the past Moldova is in no position to choose; it 
now has to regain the EU’s trust if it is to have a place within the EU’s borders. 
a. ENP Benefits: The Political Dimension 
Disregarding the historic failures of Moldovan governments to implement 
their commitments and overlooking the Moldovan “double player” image of the past, on 
its part, the EU took the Action Plan’s commitments very seriously. The actual steps 
undertaken by the EU after signing the plan demonstrated a real interest directed at 
Moldova from Brussels. Even before signing the bilateral plan, in 2003, the EU showed 
its support for Chisinau’s pro-Western vector by announcing the names of the top 
seventeen Transnistrian leaders responsible for challenging the conflict settlement and 
imposing on them a travel ban within EU territories.199 A month after the ENP action 
plan was signed, a Special EU Representative for Moldova was appointed.200 The special 
representative’s mission was to monitor the progress of Moldovan reforms, personally 
facilitate the EU role in the Transnistrian conflict, and serve as a liaison officer between 
the EU and Moldova. The EU not only illustrated its political seriousness toward 
Moldova, but also gave it the possibility to have a free advisor and point of contact 
whenever one was needed. 
Latter that year, in September 2005, the EU, along with the United States, 
joined the conflict mediation process in Transnistria known as the “5+2 format.”201 
Though the EU and the United States began only as observers in the peace-settlement 
process, by posing a counterweight to Russia and assisting the voiceless OSCE and 
helpless Moldova, it was a huge step forward toward changing the balance of influence. 
The main result was soon evident, when in November 2005 the EU Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was established. The mission’s goal was to 
monitor the Moldovan-Ukrainian border along the Transnistrian segment of the 
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international frontier.202 Before EUBAM’s establishment, the eastern Moldovan border 
was not controlled by the central government, thus allowing the Transnistrian regime to 
conduct illegal activities such as arms and drugs proliferation and human trafficking. The 
Border Assistance Mission succeeded in linking Moldovan and Ukrainian customs 
services, assisted in improvement of the quality of border monitoring, and obstructed the 
Transnistrian illegal activities. Even the fact that Transnistria has refused to participate in 
negotiations since 2006, thus stopping the progress in conflict resolution, does not 
diminish the great achievements of the EU’s involvement in the Transnistrian issue. Here 
again the EU clearly signals that despite the fact that Russia is believed to be the primary 
“key-holder” to the Transnistrian problem’s resolution, there may be other ways as well.   
b. ENP Benefits: The Economic and Social Dimensions 
The ENP action plan for Moldova also took into account the economic 
dimension. From the outset of EU-Moldova relations, the latter has opted for a special 
economic status with the EU. As we’ve already described, Moldova’s small economy is 
highly dependent on trade with CIS countries, particularly Russia. To avoid the risk of 
state failure every time Russia decides to suspend its trade relations, the Moldovan 
government finally acknowledged that a diversification of market was urgently needed. 
And while the EU markets are very attractive, they are also highly competitive, and a 
country like Moldova with limited natural resources has little chance to penetrate them. 
Another challenge that Moldova faced was that the national economy is mostly reliant on 
agriculture, and the EU has serious tariffs and quotas on agricultural products. Thus to get 
to those markets Moldova needed a special arrangement: it was highly unlikely that 
Moldovan products could reach the EU markets by fair competition. Even a brief look at 
EU agriculture is enough to show that by creating a special economic status for Moldova, 
the EU would just be doing Moldova a favor, since it has enough agriculture products on 
its own. 
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Here again the EU demonstrated its seriousness and interest. After 
multiple reviews and analyses, the EU Council signed a “Regulation on Granting 
Additional Autonomous Trade Preferences for the Republic of Moldova,” which entered 
into force on 1 March 2008.203 This agreement will enable Moldovan exports (with some 
exceptions) to have access to the EU markets free of customs taxes and quotas, 
something that will eventually strengthen the national economy and lower the 
dependence on Russian markets. Another economic benefit that the EU has brought lately 
to Moldova is facilitated by the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. 
By monitoring the Eastern Moldovan border, EUBAM makes sure that the exported 
goods have Moldovan customs stamps only. This has forced many economic agents from 
Transnistria to register with the central government in Chisinau, a step that increases the 
level of governmental control over the flow of imports and exports, as well as the 
collection of additional taxes.204 From an economic point of view this should be a 
significant step forward to the reintegration of Moldova’s and Transnistria’s economic 
segments.   
In the social framework, in April 2007, the EU opened a Common Visa 
Application Center in Chisinau. The center was created at the Moldovan government’s 
request since many EU countries have their diplomatic missions accredited in Moldova 
stationed on the territory of neighboring states, especially Romania. Therefore, after the 
accession of Romania into the EU the Moldovan citizens faced a real challenge obtaining 
visas for traveling abroad. The Visa Application Center will, however, allow processing 
of some 10,000 visa applications per year directly from Chisinau.205 
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Additionally, an EU-Moldova Visa Facilitation and Readmission 
Agreement was signed at the end of 2007 and went into effect in January 2008. 
According to this agreement the price for EU visas will be cut in half, the applications 
will be processed faster, and there will be free multi-entrance visas for specific Moldovan 
citizens, such as governmental officials, students in the EU, and transnational drivers.206 
This development is a considerable step ahead toward the eventual free travel for the 
Moldovan people in the EU territories, especially taking into consideration that even 
between the EU’s old and new members there are issues concerning the free flow of 
people.207  
In sum, we conclude that even though there were gaps in the EU-Moldova 
relations in the past, the EU has not lost interest in Moldova. It has provided many 
assistance tools for the Moldovan government to use in its efforts to integrate the country 
into the EU via the EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan. Though the aim of this section was 
not to show the Moldovan domestic progress within the Action Plan, the results imply 
that the EU has evaluated the Moldovan performance positively. The EU’s policy of 
conditionality in the integration process is well known;208 therefore, the implemented 
commitments on the EU’s side suggest that the Union approves Moldova’s reforms. As 
the EU granted favors and supported Moldova in its development, especially for the last 
five years, this must mean that Moldova is on track with the EU’s policies. And though 
the EU has not officially promised full membership to Moldova, its progress within the 
ENP framework brings Moldova closer to Europe.  
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At this point, Moldova’s future relations with the EU and the speed with 
which the country will develop are in the hands of its leaders. Moldovan governments 
wasted enough time in the past when they let the EU put Moldova in the post-Soviet 
“basket” rather than on the Central-Eastern European “team.” The last phase of its pro-
EU vector started when other ex-Soviet countries were already almost full EU members, 
thereby positioning the country at least a decade behind.209 Given the “lessons learned” 
by the EU officials after the 2004 “Big-Bang” enlargement, the EU may be giving 
Moldova one last chance to catch the “European train” intended for the Western Balkans. 
The ENP Action Plan is essential for Moldovan government and all further dialogue will 
be conducted depending on its implementation. After the expiration of the present action 
plan this year (2008), Moldova must strongly seek another special framework for 
cooperation with the EU, which some EU officials have already announced is a 
possibility.210 
The main tasks that Moldova must accomplish include complying with its 
ENP commitments, increasing the EU’s level of trust through practical achievements, and 
continuing its pro-EU path. It also needs to think about other “carrots” that could be 
offered to the EU so it will consider a full EU membership for Moldova.  
D. CONCLUSION  
One of the main actors having a direct effect on the Moldova’s EU integration 
process, the EU itself, disregarding the gaps in the EU-Moldova relations in the past, has 
not lost its interest in Moldova. It has provided many assistance tools for the Moldovan 
government to use in its efforts to integrate the country into the EU via the EU-Moldova 
ENP Action Plan. Since the 2003 Moldovan declaration aimed at the EU integration, the 
EU have restricted the movement of the Transnistrian leadership in the EU territories and 
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appointed a special representative to Moldova. It later got involved in the Transnistrian 
conflict resolution process by taking an observer status in the 5+2 format along with the 
U.S. It additionally established a Border Monitoring Mission (EUBAM) in order to 
enhance the Moldovan-Ukrainian international border control along the Transnistrian 
segment. It finally signed special agreements regarding the EU visa facilitation for  the 
Moldovan citizens and granting Chisinau special trade preferences. At the same time the 
EU supports Moldovan permanent neutrality and its pro-Western direction. And though 
the EU has not officially promised full membership to Moldova, its progress within the 
ENP framework brings Moldova closer to Europe.  
Russia, on the other hand, tries its best to obstruct Moldova’s way toward the EU 
although it officially does not mind Chisinau’s EU aspirations. This very attempt of 
Russia is based on the Moldovan status of permanent neutrality which is extremely 
important to Russia. While protecting its own interests in the region, Russia uses its 
political, economic, and military leverage to keep Moldova in its sphere of influence as 
much as possible. Moldova being dependent on Russia economically, and needing 
Russia’s involvement in order to solve the Transnistrian issue, puts the country in a very 
difficult position. The Transnistrian conflict and Russia’s economic leverage are used to 
regulate Moldova’s domestic and foreign policies according to Kremlin’s wishes. 
Moldova’s desire to solve the Transnistrian stalemate places the country in a very 
difficult stance in the negotiation process with Russia, since controlling Transnistria, and 
thus influencing Moldova’s EU integration process, there is little else left that would 
interest Moscow at the moment.  
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V.  NEUTRALITY OR ALIGNMENT: COMPARING CASE 
STUDIES  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Austria succeeded to integrate into the European Union in 1995 maintaining its 
status of permanent neutrality. Latvia, on the other hand did the opposite. Not only did 
not Latvia opt for neutrality it made its aligned status a mainstream if its integration 
process in 2004 successfully acceded NATO and the EU.  
As we familiarized with the EU integration processes of Austria and Latvia, this 
following chapter will briefly review these examples emphasizing the strong and weak 
points of these two countries in their EU endeavor. We will try to understand which 
factors facilitated and  which ones posed barriers in the integration process. Since Austria 
and Latvia had different conditions before and during the process, and additionally 
because the Moldovan political elites debating about the country’s EU integration point at 
these two examples – each case will be separately tested against the Moldovan realities. 
Such an approach will enable the reader to understand better what similarities and 
differences Moldova has with the mentioned tow countries, and consequently it will 
crystallize the idea of what path the Moldovan government shall take in its pro-EU road.  
B.  THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESSES: REVIEWS  
1.  Neutral Integration: Austria’s Strengths and Weaknesses before Its 
EU Accession  
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the two options that dominate 
discussions in Moldovan political circles in regard to the country’s integration into the 
EU: membership as a neutral country or membership as an aligned country. One option is 
that Moldova could become an EU member as a neutral country. To discuss the neutrality 
option, we will draw on the example of Austria described in Chapter III and then test 
Moldova’s situation against that. 
When Austria became a member of the EU in 1995, it did so while retaining its 
neutral status. This shows that the EU is not a military alliance and thus any neutral state  
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can choose to do the same. By examining Austria’s domestic circumstances, we can 
determine how well Austria was doing before it was accepted by the EU. Politically, 
Austria’s leaders were highly committed to EU membership. They expressed Austria’s 
desire to become part of the Union, accomplished all the necessary requirements, and 
supported the EU’s interests.211 Austria benefited considerably by its accomplishment of 
a smooth and easy reformation process. However, Austria had little to change, since its 
political, economic, judicial, and societal systems were already similar to those of the 
EU. Though Austria had been a neutral country during the Cold War, there was little 
difference between it and other Western European countries. As a consolidated, 
pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law and a market economy, only relatively 
insignificant changes were needed for Austria to adjust to the EU’s rules and policies. In 
addition, because of Austria’s historically proven neutrality, there were no external actors 
that could challenge Austria’s internal affairs and aspirations. This meant that the 
transformation process after the Cold War was entirely in the hands of the local 
government. Even Russia, a former strong proponent of Austria’s neutral stand, has not 
attempted to question Austria’s neutrality and its pro-EU vector.  
Also, at the outset of its accession to the EU, Austria’s economy was quite strong, 
leading to a gross domestic product (GDP) of $ 21,000 per capita.212 Since the EU’s main 
orientation, especially at that point in time, was the economic development of the Union, 
Austria’s strong economy on the one hand and the EU’s large markets on the other, fit the 
interests of both. Austria wanted to become richer and by doing so it would add more 
wealth and power to the EU. As we briefly illustrated in Chapter III, the EU aimed at 
enlargement and was very willing to accept its rich neighboring countries. The richer the 
individual members, the wealthier the Union would become. 
Thus, regardless of its neutral status, which could eventually be a challenge to the 
EU internally, Austria was fairly well positioned within the Union. And though the EU 
might have preferred an aligned Austria, it had no problem with the Austria’s neutral 
strategic status. This makes perfect sense, especially when we consider that Austria still 
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had a relatively large and strong military that was capable of accomplishing various tasks, 
including conventional war-fighting, antiterrorist activities, and peace-support 
operations.213 In any attack on Austria, therefore, the EU would have to use few of its 
own resources, while, in peace time, it could use Austria’s military capabilities within the 
framework of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP). Given the low 
possibility of a war in Europe and the absence of any potential enemies of Austria, the 
EU, being concerned with increasing its common defense capabilities, would only benefit 
from the Austrian military contribution. And the aligned EU members, which often have 
their militaries engaged in activities such as NATO operations, could rely more on 
Austria’s forces for the EU’s peace projects.  
The last major plus that Austria had for a quick integration into the EU was its 
Occidental society. Historically, the Austrian nation has been one of the most developed 
in Europe and one of the leading nations for the world’s enlightenment. From the time of 
the Hapsburgs it has been politically, socially, and culturally at the heart of Europe, and 
thus has shared European values for a long time. And even with its neutral position after 
World War II, Austria did not fall behind the other developed European nations. When it 
expressed its desire to join the European “club” in the late 1980s, it was just as 
democratic, free, and liberal as France, Germany, or Great Britain. Therefore, 
psychologically, as it shared all the true European norms, rules, and values, Austrian 
society was totally ready to integrate into the European family from the very beginning.  
In sum, we can see that Austria integrated into the EU fairly easily because it was 
basically ready for accession. It was a consolidated democracy with a stable political 
system and had a relatively strong economy that supported a high standard of living for 
the Austrian people. In addition, it sustained a capable military and had had a 
Westernized society for centuries. All these characteristics were the strong points that 
facilitated the country’s accession to the EU.  
The only issue that could be viewed as a challenge to the accession, therefore, was 
Austria’s neutrality. As we showed in Chapter III, the Austrian public strongly supported 
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their country’s neutral status. And if there was a choice to be made between maintaining 
its neutrality and EU membership, they would have chosen neutrality. Political leaders 
may be able to disagree with external actors, but few politicians choose to go against their 
own people. Therefore, in Austria, the neutrality issue was only a minor hardship. The 
Austrian government successfully overcame it as a barrier to EU membership by 
convincing the population that the EU membership would not undermine Austria’s 
neutrality. Since neutrality was legally compatible with the EU charter, neutrality was 
primarily an Austrian concern, not the EU’s. The fact that the EU so readily consented to 
Austria’s neutrality and the absence of any belligerent’s protests indicate that neutrality 
actually had little effect on the Austrian integration process.214  
These facts, plus the fact that Austria and the EU were the only actors involved in 
the integration process, makes this case an example of an “ideal integration process.” 
However, while lessons can be learned from this example, in order to objectively take 
this case as a standard for other neutral states’ EU accession, all the same conditions must 
be present.    
2.  Aligned Integration: Latvia’s Strengths and Weaknesses before Its 
Accession to the EU 
As we saw in Chapter III, in contrast to Austria, Latvia integrated into the EU in 
2004 as an aligned country. In addition, although neutrality made no difference in the 
Austrian integration process, as we will show, it was its strategic aligned status that 
actually brought Latvia into the European Union.  
As a result of being under Soviet control, Latvia had multiple problems before its 
EU accession. The Latvian political system at the beginning of the 1990s was in chaos, 
with its new political elite being pro-Western on the one hand, while having a Soviet 
education and experience on the other. The country’s initial post-Soviet image and its 
poorly accomplished commitments, even though the result of a lack of knowledge, were 
not very beneficial to a nation that wanted a fair partnership with the EU. Latvian politics 
quickly improved, however, and its Western orientation was rapidly consolidated despite 
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the domestic opposition of a large Russian-speaking population.215 Political reform in 
Latvia quickly evolved and democratic norms such as free and fair elections, constructive 
dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties, and freedom of the press were 
introduced. Consequently, by the end of the independence decade, Latvia had become a 
true free democracy.216   
In regard to security issues, Latvian leaders, who were concerned that there might 
be an eventual Russian revival, rushed to find a place for themselves under the European 
sky. While acknowledging their problems, they decided that the only way to secure the 
country and integrate it into the EU was via NATO. Thus, NATO became the main point 
of interest and a focal point for Latvian governments, and Latvia’s strategic status as an 
aligned country became the cornerstone of its future prosperity.  
Throughout the 1990s, it transformed its small, weak military, focusing on the 
development of niche capabilities. By demonstrating its desire for supporting the 
European security efforts and keeping its promises, the Latvian military obtained support 
from other countries and by the beginning of the new millennium had become a small but 
capable force.217 And though some may say that in 2004 Latvia’s military still did not 
measure up to NATO standards, NATO saw it differently. Latvia’s actual capabilities 
seemed to be less important than its commitments, plans, and proof of future 
development. NATO saw a promising country, a future true European democracy with 
sufficient military capabilities and commitment to contribute to the common European 
security goal, thus granting Latvia NATO membership, which ultimately helped it to 
integrate into the EU.   
However, in the early 1990s Latvia’s economy, similarly to other ex-Soviet 
republics, was devastated which meant that there were many challenges to a good 
standard of life for the Latvian people. Nonetheless, the government quickly began a 
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reformation process that was aimed at transforming the Latvian economy into a true 
market economy. Being assisted by international experts it successfully completed the 
privatization reform by 2003 and managed to achieve a result of $7,730 GDP per capita, 
which continued to grow.218 The Latvian market was diversified and more economic 
relations with Western countries were achieved. The political vector toward Europe 
increased the level of trust in business conditions and more foreign direct investment 
(FDI) began to flow into Latvia’s promising economy. The EU could see its actual 
achievements and assess their future economic success, a fact that greatly benefited 
Latvia’s acceptance by the EU. Being under NATO’s security umbrella removed all 
remaining doubts about Latvia’s investment security, and just after its NATO accession, 
Latvia’s FDI doubled.219 Though not without difficulty, Latvia’s leaders gradually 
defeated its Eastern economic direction and became more focused on the Westernization 
of the economy.220 These facts, along with Latvian hard work, allowed the economy to 
advance, thus bringing it closer to EU standards, as Latvia also managed to keep its 
promises and commitments to its European counterparts.  
Latvia faced challenges socially as well. Although Latvia has a pro-Western 
population for the most part, as we remember about 40 percent of the Latvian population 
is made up of Russian-speakers inherited from the Soviet era, which viewed the EU, and 
especially NATO, as strangers, if not enemies. This split in Latvian beliefs was a difficult 
burden for the government, but despite existing problems, Latvia managed to increase the 
level of the society’s support for its Euro-Atlantic integration. Its democratic lifestyle and 
the social programs introduced by Latvia’s governments inspired even those people who 
supported a more anti-Western point of view.221 The Russian-speaking segment of the 
society’s empathy toward Russia lessened, as they came to see Russia as a country 
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characterized by poverty, violations of basic human rights, and overall chaos. More 
people began to reassess their ideas and views of the collapsed Soviet Union and its 
“successor” and, though still complaining, preferred living in Latvia rather than returning 
to Russia. These domestic circumstances in addition to the socialization process of the 
EU and NATO norms diffusion programs facilitated a social change in Latvia resulted in 
the great majority of Latvia’s population’s supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration.  
In contrast to Austria, therefore, before its accession to the EU, all of Latvia’s 
domestic dimensions were challenged. As a result of its being an ex-Soviet country, 
Latvia experienced political, economic, and social hardships that had to be overcome in 
order to integrate into the EU. Latvia’s greatest strength was its extreme desire to be part 
of the EU and to do the hard work to make that happen. Latvia’s weakness after regaining  
its independence and its relatively quick progress toward NATO and the EU make its 
case admirable. Latvia succeeded because its leaders objectively assessed the country’s 
realities and options. Then they made their choice and strongly supported it by doing 
everything possible to prove their loyalty to the West. Latvia’s total alignment to the 
West was the mainstay of its integration strategy. Looking at Latvia as an example we 
can conclude that sometimes capabilities are less important than the willingness and 
commitments to obtain those capabilities. Latvia made the EU believe that even though it 
might not have had the necessary standards for a fair accession, its choice was final and 
its willingness to work hard toward improvement was serious. It succeeded in convincing 
Europe that both the EU and Latvia would benefit from the Latvian accession to the 
Union. The fact that Latvia was accepted into the EU without having yet signed a border 
treaty with Russia222 illustrates how much the EU values seriousness, commitment, and 
loyalty.     
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C.  NEUTRAL OR ALIGNED EU INTEGRATION: TESTING MOLDOVA’S 
REALITIES AGAINST THE TWO CASE STUDIES 
1.  General Comparison 
Comparing Moldova with the two case studies, we can see that the facts “on the 
ground” position Moldova closer to Latvia than to Austria. More specifically, we can say 
that besides the fact that Moldova wants to integrate into the EU as a neutral country, as 
Austria did, the two have nothing else in common. The common Soviet past, on the other 
hand, puts Moldova in the Latvian ‘basket’ in this study.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, Moldova’s political agenda was similar to Latvia’s, 
which is not surprising since all the ex-Soviet republics had similar agendas after the 
USSR dissolution. But while Latvia rushed from the very beginning to do everything 
possible in order to get closer to Europe, Moldova has moved much slower. In 1994 it 
expressed its desire for a dialogue and partnership with the EU, but their bilateral 
relations were only on the paper until 1998 when the Moldova–EU Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into force.223 Moldova’s pro-EU commitments 
were merely rhetorical, while its “double-game” policy favored Russia. The political elite 
was concerned more with acquiring and keeping power than with the country’s 
development. The reformation process was slow and the political dimension barely 
improved. In Brussels’ eyes, these policies undermined Moldova’s true abilities and 
intentions. Even after the radical change in Moldova’s foreign policy in 2003, the EU has 
more than enough incentives not to trust the Moldovan incumbents.224 Thus, in contrast 
to Austria, which has been a truly consolidated and politically stable democracy, and 
Latvia, which had problems but has been quickly improving, Moldova looks very much 
like a state with an undecided and impotent domestic and foreign policy.  
Economically, Moldova is extremely far from where Austria was before its 
accession into the EU, and already quite far from Latvia as well. Moldova’s GDP in 2006 
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– 2007 amounted to only $ 1,868 per capita,225 while its FDI was about $ 222 million.226 
Its lack of natural resources and an agriculture-oriented economy positions the country on 
the “bottom shelf” among European economies. The Transnistrian problem besides 
taking away about 40 percent of the possible national income, also keeps potential 
investors off Moldova’s economy, thereby enhancing the economic problem. 
Dependence on Russian markets caused Moldovan exports to become vulnerable to the 
modern economic competition, while Russian energy imports turned Moldova into a 
hostage at the master’s mercy.227 In an eventual EU accession, not only would the 
Moldovan economy not benefit the EU, it may be a burden to the other EU member 
states. The challenges the EU has faced after the last enlargement wave suggest that not 
everyone is happy that the Union’s new members’ development is at the cost of the richer 
ones.228 A stable economy like Austria’s, or at least the evident promise for a stable 
economy in the future as in Latvia, is the mainstay the EU policies rest on. Moldova, 
having almost no mineral resources, being dependent on Russian markets, and 
continuously failing to introduce effective economic reforms, has little chance to impress 
the EU. Additionally, having unresolved security problems such as the Transnistrian 
conflict and Russian troops in the country continues to keep potential investors out of 
Moldova’s economy, thus decreasing the chance for faster development.   
From a security point of view, as we showed earlier, Moldova maintains a status 
of permanent neutrality. This status, however, has been violated externally by Russia and 
internally by Moldova itself and seems thus more a “façade” than a true state’s security 
strategy. Also, while Austria maintains a military capable of protecting its neutral status, 
and Latvia has also built a small but capable military, Moldova has gradually downsized 
its military over the years, making the country militarily weak. It is right that the EU does 
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not mind a neutrality clause, but it is also important to mention that at the same time the 
Union has a well-defined security and defense policy. And in order to maintain a certain 
level, it needs the member states to be ready to commit military capabilities. Based on the 
current situation, it is hardly imaginable that Moldova could contribute to the ESDP if it 
were to become an EU member tomorrow, whereas the actions of the Moldovan president 
who recently proposed a total demilitarization of the country229 totally eliminates the 
theoretical right for an equal participation of Moldova in the ESDP. One might even say 
that the EU will not “suffer” without the Moldovan contribution to the EU’s security, but 
it is for the Moldovan government to understand that eventual military contributions 
within the ESDP is one of the very few “utilities” Moldova could offer to the EU. And 
while it is not suggested that neutrality is something bad, it is very important that the 
Moldovan elites do not forget that Moldovan neutrality is extremely “important” to 
Russia and that the latter wants to use this status in order to stop the country from its pro-
EU path.  
Moldova differs socially from Austria and Latvia as well. Austria, whose society 
has been always Western does not even compare, since the gap is too enormous. But even 
in comparing the Moldovan public with that of Latvia we find discrepancies. 
Disregarding for a moment the Russian-speaking population that both Moldova and 
Latvia largely inherited from the Soviet era, we find that even among so-called “real” 
Moldovans a pro-European choice is much weaker than that of the Latvians. In the mid-
90s, about 56 percent of the Moldovan people did not feel “European.”230 Consequently, 
especially after electing the Communist Party to rule the state, Moldova reached a point 
where it almost totally lost its interest in the West in terms of the country’s destiny. 
Though this situation gradually changed, it took a great deal of valuable time for 
Moldovans to understand the true value of Europe and change their vision. After the  
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sudden political changes in 2003, Moldova initiated more informational projects so the 
public could learn about the EU. Change happened so fast that already in 2007 over 72 
percent of the Moldovan public was in favor of EU membership.231  
In sum, other than in its neutral status, Austria is beyond comparison with 
Moldova, because it was prepared in every other way for EU integration. At the same 
time, like Latvia’s attempt to integrate into the EU, Moldova has faced challenges in 
every other aspect of its national situation. However, in contrast to Latvia, the Moldovan 
governments failed to introduce the necessary productive reforms, thus wasting a lot of 
time – time that could cost Moldova its EU integration. The EU is not limitlessly flexible 
and its enlargement process is not infinite. If the Moldovan leaders do not learn this 
lesson, they may miss the last “train to Europe.”  
2.  A Neutral Integration?  
At this point, it is time to return to the main aim of the thesis, Moldova’s two 
options for integration into the EU: as a neutral state or as an aligned state. The center-
left parties on Moldovan politics say that since Moldova can integrate into the EU and 
still maintain its neutral status - this is the right path to take. As our research has shown, 
in theory, this is not impossible. The EU has no problem accepting neutral states. Indeed, 
the case of Austria illustrates just how willing the EU is to integrate neutral countries. 
While any such union might prefer aligned states, where members are bound by certain 
common regulations, a neutral state may still not pose a problem. Given the solidarity and 
cooperation frameworks of the EU, the worst thing that a neutral country could do to the 
Union is to do nothing. Neutrals, at their discretion, can choose whether or not to support 
specific policies, regulations, and positions, and their staying on the sidelines would 
cause no problem for the organization. An eventual acceptance of a neutral Moldova into 
the EU is therefore possible.  
However, neutrality is a privilege; it allows a state at given points to either agree 
or disagree, with no right reserved for others to object. Having a neutral status means that 
a country’s refusal or disagreement does not require an action: neutrals have the legal 
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right not to act in any way if they do not wish to do so. This can be a very convenient 
position, especially in today’s globalized world where everything and everyone is seen as 
interconnected and sometimes “laying low” can be beneficial. Thus, if a neutral state 
wishes to have good relations with other states in a union such as the EU, it must “pay” 
for an eventual possibility of staying aside from the rest. Austria and other neutrals “pay” 
by using their valuable resources and capabilities. For example, a country may serve as 
mediator or facilitator in different disputes at its own expense or in other similar interim 
activities. In this regard, it is important to remember, however, that when Austria was 
integrated into the EU, it was already a stable country with strong political, economic, 
and social systems. Therefore, its neutrality per se was not an issue for the EU. 
In this respect, Moldova is totally different from Austria. It has an “unhealthy” 
political system, in which a communist party still runs the country. It is no secret in 
Brussels that in Moldova there is corruption at all government levels, oppression of the 
political opposition, and restriction of a free media.232 In addition, the political “double 
game” being played by the Moldovan government definitely may increase the EU’s 
skepticism about the Moldova’s actual position. Additionally, Moldova’s weak economy 
and a population who wants EU integration while not feeling especially European is not 
something that the EU needs either.233 A capable military that could be used for various 
ESDP missions, thus improving Moldova’s attractiveness, is also absent. Frankly, 
Moldova does not have much to offer the EU. In fact, it has almost nothing. Why would 
the EU accept such a country, moreover, one that is neutral, with all that means for EU 
membership?   
As we have illustrated, where Austria had numerous strong points, Moldova has 
only weak ones. Indeed, it is almost impossible to discuss the two in an objective 
comparison. Regardless of its security status, whether a benefit or not, Moldova is far 
from being prepared to integrate into the EU. In other words, for the time being at least, 
its neutral status has no significance for the integration process. Moldova has a long way 
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to go in improving its political system, developing its economy, and educating its society 
in a European way. To accomplish these things, it must work closely with the EU, hoping 
for advice that will help the country qualify for the “Copenhagen criteria.” Only then will 
it be time to talk about the neutrality clause.  
As we have shown, Russia strongly advocates Moldovan neutrality as part of its 
attempt to gain control the entirety of Moldova through its “Transnistrianisation.”234 If 
Chisinau were to accept this Russian version of “guaranteed neutrality,” its chance to 
integrate into the EU would be lost forever. Transnistria would use its veto powers to 
prevent a pro-Western process.235 And the country’s reintegration at the cost of forfeiting 
a future EU membership is inadmissible. Thus, if Moldova wants remain a neutral state, 
it should simply maintain its current neutral status. It, at least, will not put the country 
legally in Russian hands. 
3.  An Aligned Integration?  
In contrast to the center-left parties, Moldova’s center-right politicians favor a 
Latvian model of EU integration. They say that neutrality is an obstacle to Moldova’s EU 
integration and that it should be abandoned in favor of NATO membership, which would 
eventually get the country into the EU.  
In light of our analysis of the Latvian case, at first glance, this paradigm seems 
reasonable. Since the end of the Cold War, Moldova’s neutrality has played a rather 
negative role in the country’s evolution. Unlike Latvia, it restrained the country from 
seeking membership under NATO’s security umbrella. If NATO accession had been on 
the agenda in Moldova at the same time as in other Central-Eastern European countries, 
Moldova’s fate might have been different. But NATO membership was ruled out from 
the start, and the vacuum that resulted from the dissolution of the USSR was filled by a 
strategic partnership with Russia. It is that partnership that is the cause of Moldova’s 
current problems. 
                                                 
234 This term is often used in Moldova to illustrate the already described Russian tactic for taking 
control over whole Moldova via Transnistrian conflict resolution.  
235 In its 2005 “Foreign Policy Objectives,” the so-called Transnistrian “parliament” stated that 
Transnistria is opposed to EU and NATO enlargement. See Ryan, 1.  
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The center-rightists call, therefore, for Moldova to learn a lesson from the Baltic 
States’ experience, suggesting that taking the right path later is better than never. And 
adopting the Latvian EU integration model would indeed probably result in various 
benefits for Moldova. First, NATO would assist in the European integration process by 
offering its expertise. Considering that the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU 
are based on the same values and that both organizations would be involved, the 
integration process would be at least twice as fast. Second, the process of introducing 
EU-driven reforms would give Moldovan officials an additional source of constructive 
pressure to quicken the implement of those reforms. Third, when NATO is interested in a 
country it supports not only its armed forces but also every other dimension of its 
reformation process.236 With NATO membership Moldova would get a total level of 
security, thus opening the door to foreign investment. This would ultimately foster a 
national economy that would be closer to EU standards. But the most important benefit 
that an eventual NATO membership would bring is providing Moldova with a special 
status of partnership with the United States. And an increase in U.S. interest in Moldova 
may be vital because only the United States has a way to negotiate with Russia.  
Furthermore, because of its small size, Moldova’s membership would have little 
effect on EU processes.237 Thus it is possible that the EU would accept Moldova as it is, 
even if not very developed, after the NATO security umbrella is assured. Given the many 
benefits that Moldova could gain by giving up its neutrality, which is more or less 
ineffective anyway, it may be hard to understand why Moldova still retains the neutral 
status. 
The reality, however, is more complicated. By giving up its neutral status, 
Moldova will probably lose forever any possibility of reintegrating the country. Russia is 
determined to make sure that NATO does not move into this part of the continent, and if  
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237 After the 2004 “Big-Bang” it was estimated that the aggregate output of all 10 candidate countries 
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Moldova abolished its neutrality Russia will never pull out its troops. As the Russian 
troops have not left for sixteen years while Moldova was neutral, the word “never” seems 
most appropriate. 
Also, during the NATO integration process Russia could easily put economic 
pressure on Moldova as it did recently when the “wine war” was lunched on Moldova. If 
Russia chose to do this then, one can only imagine what damage it could cause to the 
Moldovan economy if it had Moldova’s NATO membership as a reason. Still, in 
accomplishing important goals, none of these should be reasons for a country to change 
its desired vector. Moldova, however, is very dependent on Russia economically, and 
therefore economic sanctions by Russia might even lead to state failure. Such a result 
would neither provide a decent level of life for the Moldovan people nor integrate the 
country into the European institutions. If the EU is not happy with Moldova’s situation 
today, it is hard to believe that it will change its opinion if Moldova gets worse.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
To conclude, our research shows that the main actors that can and do influence 
Moldova’s integration into the European Union are the EU itself and the Russian 
Federation. While the EU is involved in a positive way trying to assist Moldova on its 
way to Europe, Russia obstructs the process by using whatever tools are available, such 
as economic means and its special status in the Transnistrian conflict resolution process. 
Russia’s position would not be as important as it is if it did not play a main role in two 
key areas of Moldovan vulnerability: its reintegration and its economy. 
In regard to the two options open for Moldova’s EU integration, we found that the 
Latvian example for joining the EU via NATO is the best fit, since Latvia and Moldova 
were in similar situations after the collapse of the USSR. Nonetheless, though Latvia is a 
good example for countries that are alike of how to quickly integrate into the EU, 
Moldova cannot afford to do so. The mistakes made by its governments in the aftermath 
of the Cold War left the country under a strong Russian dependence. Thus, if Moldova 
tried to repeat what Latvia did, it is hardly likely that it would succeed.  
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The key issues that obstruct Moldova’s integration process are interconnected: the 
country’s disintegration drags down the economy, which in turn impedes Moldova’s 
qualification for EU accession. And since Moldova’s reintegration is in Russia’s hands, 
Moldova’s EU integration also depends on Moscow. Therefore, given that Russia will 
only accept a non-NATO Moldova, abolishing its neutrality does not seem to be the best 
decision, at least for now.  
And as, in theory, attempting to get EU membership while continuing to maintain 
its neutrality does not pose a problem for Moldova, even discussing this option seems 
premature. Moldova is far from ready for full EU integration, and it has a tremendous 
amount of work to do to get closer to EU standards. Therefore, for the time being, the 
country’s security strategy does not make a significant difference, and all the discussions 
within the political circles about a potential Moldovan EU accession, with a neutrality 
clause, appear to be a waste of time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Moldova 
should allow the Russian model of “guaranteed neutrality” which is aimed at 
transforming Moldova into a political hostage of Russia. If Moldova is to be neutral, than 
its present status is more fitting for Moldovan interests than the model proposed by 
Russia. Though its present status of neutrality does not help in Moldova’s EU integration 
process, it does not obstruct it either. Given Moldova’s current realities, this is not the 
worst scenario.  
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate whether the Republic of 
Moldova can achieve its desire to join the European Union (EU) while continuing to 
maintain a status of neutrality. The need for this research arose from the debate in the 
political circles of Moldova. The center-left-wing parties insist that a status of permanent 
neutrality best fits the country’s interests and is completely compatible with the EU 
regulations vis-à-vis Moldova’s aspirations for EU integration. They argue, in particular, 
that showing the international community that Moldova is a completely peaceful country 
will eliminate any potential foes and thus facilitate Moldova’s pro-EU path. In defending 
this point of view, the neutrality supporters point to other neutral states such as Austria 
which succeeded in becoming an EU member in 1995 while maintaining its neutrality.238 
Moldova’s right-wing parties believe, however, that Moldova’s neutral status 
works against its national security interests by making the country unable to defend itself 
in the Machtpolitik world. They argue that Moldova’s neutral position distances the 
country from attaining security through alignment with other European countries in 
military coalitions, while leaving the state alone in facing dangerous actors such as the 
Russian Federation. The resulting insecurity, they further argue, jeopardizes Moldova’s 
integration into the EU, since the EU does not need or want to include insecure or weak 
states. Thus they opt in favor of refuting neutrality and joining NATO, a step that they 
believe would strengthen Moldova’s security and eventually make the country more 
attractive and acceptable to the EU. In advocating this position, the center-rightists refer 
to the lessons learned from other former Communist countries, such as Latvia, which, by 
using this matrix, fairly quickly integrated into the Euro-Atlantic institution after the end 
of the Cold War.239  
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The thesis began by analyzing the classical concept of neutrality as a security 
strategy. We then looked both at Austria’s neutral integration into the EU and at Latvia’s 
aligned integration. From that research, we reached the following conclusions.  
1.  Classical Concept of Permanent Neutrality 
Until the nineteenth century, states occasionally adopted a status of neutrality to 
avoid undesired war. After the now classical concept of permanent neutrality was 
imposed on Switzerland in 1815 as a security strategy, however, it began to be chosen 
also by other states. It gained international recognition at the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions for status-quo states that wished to choose neutral status as a means to avoid 
being dragged into the wars of more powerful states. And, traditionally, states that choose 
a permanent neutral strategy as a means to maintain their national security must be able 
to protect that status. The rights and benefits of neutral states are stipulated in 
international law; however, there is no guaranty that the law will always be observed. 
Therefore, while respecting their obligations and refuting internal violations of their 
neutrality, neutral states should also use all means possible to protect their neutrality from 
external violations.240 
The status of permanent neutrality now relies on status-quo states’ assurance to 
potentially belligerent countries that their neutral status is not only permanent but is also 
based on their use of a combination of positive and negative strategy components. By 
implementing such components – such as initially providing various tertiary services – 
neutral states can create a credible basis for neutrality during both peacetime and 
wartime. In addition to peaceful assurances, neutrals must also develop deterrent 
capabilities that will show potential aggressors that the costs of aggression may be greater 
than the benefits. Such deterrent capabilities will derive primarily from neutrals’ own 
strategic, economic, and military resources. 
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2.  Austria’s Neo-Neutrality and the EU’s Security Framework 
Although Austria became a neutral state after the end of the Second World War 
because it had no choice, it took its neutral status seriously and, during the entirety of the 
Cold War, continued to observe the classical requirements of neutrality. As the USSR 
began to collapse, however, and the 1990s brought new changes to the international 
system, the Austrian government reassessed its neutrality conditions and came up with a 
new approach, which we refer to here as “neo-neutrality.” As the Austrian government 
began to analyze this new approach to determine whether neo-neutrality could 
accommodate the EU’s security policies, it soon realized that the EU’s approach to 
security was quite comprehensive. The EU views conventional war as obsolete and takes 
the current threats – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organized crime – into account in a very different way. In 
dealing with these and other threats, it focuses primarily on the civilian dimension. For 
the EU, therefore, Austria’s neutrality was not taboo, and in 1995, it was granted full 
membership.241 
However, while its neutrality status was a subject of consideration before 
Austria’s EU accession, what is more significant is that, in all other aspects, the country 
was ready for integration. It was a consolidated democracy with a stable political system 
and had a relatively strong economy that supported a high standard of living for the 
Austrian people. In addition, it sustained a capable military and had had a Westernized 
society for centuries. All of these aspects were significant factors in facilitating the 
country’s EU accession that should not be overlooked when assessing Austria’s 
integration process.  
3.  Latvia’s Aligned Strategy and Its Role in the EU Integration Process 
In contrast to Austria, before Latvia was accepted into the EU, all of its domestic 
practices were challenged. Like all ex-Soviet countries, Latvia experienced political, 
economic, and social hardships, which had to be overcome in order to integrate into the 
EU. In this respect, Latvia’s greatest strength was its extreme desire for EU membership 
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and its willingness to do the hard work necessary to make that happen. After objectively 
assessing both the country’s realities and its options, and in light of their concerns about 
an eventual Russian revival, Latvia’s leaders decided that the only way the country could 
find its place in Europe was through NATO. Thus, NATO membership became the 
cornerstone of Latvia’s European integration process242 while, at the same time, it began 
to implement the reforms necessary for EU accession.  
Once Latvia had chosen this course, it supported it by doing everything possible 
to prove its loyalty to the West. As a result, Latvia’s wholehearted alignment with NATO 
and the EU were the mainstay of its integration strategy. Although lacking any real 
political, economic, social, or military strength, Latvia desperately allocated every 
possible resource to raising its capability levels as high as possible. This convinced the 
EU that though Latvia fell short of the necessary standards for a typical accession, its 
choice was final and its willingness to work hard at improvement was serious. It 
succeeded in convincing Europe that both the West and Latvia would benefit from 
Latvia’s accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions and in 2004 was accepted by both 
NATO and the EU.243  
4.  Moldova’s EU Integration Process vis-à-vis the Main Regional Actors 
In 1994, after a brief civil war with the secessionist Transnistrian enclave 
supported by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldova declared its permanent 
neutrality. At the time, its decision for neutrality was aimed at facilitating a conflict 
settlement and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region stationed under a 
peacekeeping umbrella. So far, Moldova’s permanent neutrality seems to have been 
largely ineffective. Its political leaders have executed Moldova’s neutrality as a security 
strategy in ways that makes little sense in terms either of its neutrality or of its security. 
Their approach has resulted in a major reduction of the national military which places the 
country in a very poor security posture militarily. And at the same time, Moldovan 
officials have played a double game between the West and Russia by maintaining a 
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special economic relationship with Russia while emphasizing Moldova’s intentions to 
join the EU and cooperating militarily with NATO. In addition, Moldova has violated a 
central tenet of neutrality by its military participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom; and its 
failure to protect itself from external intervention by Russia, whose troops remain on 
Moldovan soil, seriously undermines Moldova’s neutral status. 
Nevertheless, the EU, disregarding the gaps in EU–Moldova relations in the past, 
has not lost interest in Moldova. It has provided many assistance tools for the Moldovan 
government to use in its efforts to integrate the country into the EU via an EU-Moldova 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan. Since the 2003 Moldovan declaration 
aimed at EU integration, the EU has restricted the movement of the Transnistrian 
leadership in EU territories and appointed a special representative to Moldova. It recently 
got involved in the Transnistrian conflict-resolution process by joining with the U.S as an 
observer in keeping with the 5+2 format. It additionally established a Border Monitoring 
Mission (EUBAM) in order to enhance Moldovan-Ukrainian international border control 
along the Transnistrian segment. It finally signed special agreements regarding EU visa 
facilitation for Moldovan citizens and granting Chisinau special trade preferences. At the 
same time, the EU supports Moldova’s permanent neutrality and its pro-Western 
direction. And though the EU has not officially promised full membership to Moldova, 
its progress within the ENP framework brings Moldova closer to Europe.  
Russia, on the other hand, though it does not object officially to Chisinau’s EU 
aspirations, tries its best to obstruct Moldova’s progress toward the EU. Interestingly, 
Russia’s attempt is based on Moldova’s permanent neutrality status, which is extremely 
important to Russia. Having its own considerable interest in the region, Russia uses its 
political, economic, and military leverage to keep Moldova as “neutral” as possible. At 
the same time, Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia and its need for Russia’s 
involvement in order to solve the Transnistrian issue put the country in a very difficult 
position. Russia uses the Transnistrian conflict and its economic leverage to keep 
Moldova within the Russian sphere of influence. Moldova’s desire to solve the 
Transnistrian stalemate places the country in a disadvantageous position in the  
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negotiation process with Russia, since other than controlling Transnistria and using it to 
influence Moldova’s EU integration process, Moscow has little interest in Moldova at the 
moment.  
Though officially Russia is concerned only with NATO’s eastward expansion and 
does not object to Moldova’s intention to join the EU, Russia’s traditionally holistic view 
of the West and the high level of its pressure on Moldova create serious doubts about the 
Kremlin’s official position. In any case, Russia’s continued presence in Transnistria 
maintains Moldova’s unstable image in Europe, thus keeping away EU partners and 
investors. Russia has facilitated Moldova’s low economic development, political 
immaturity, and unattractiveness. And it literally blackmails Moldova with the 
Transnistrian problem, using it as its main tool for keeping Moldova under its influence. 
All of which situates Moldova in the middle of the “traditional” West–East dispute: while 
the EU assists Moldova’s Western vector, Russia uses all available means to obstruct it.  
5.  Moldova’s Realities 
As we have shown, one side of the debate about Moldova’s neutrality status in 
relation to EU membership points to Austria’s EU integration experience, the other to 
that of Latvia. Nonetheless, Moldova’s situation differs essentially from both. In contrast 
to Austria, which was a fully consolidated and politically stable democracy with strong 
economic potential, a relatively powerful military, and an Occidental society, Moldova 
has great problems in all these aspects. It has a weak political system, in which the ruling 
Communist party allows corruption at all levels of government, intimidates the political 
opposition, and restricts a free media. In addition, the political “double game” still being 
played by the Moldovan government definitely increases the EU’s skepticism about 
Moldova’s actual position. Furthermore, Moldova’s weak economy and its population’s 
lack of a European education and culture are challenges to the country’s progress with the 
EU. A capable military that could be used for various ESDP missions, thus improving 
Moldova’s attractiveness to the EU, is also absent. But it is the unresolved conflict in 
Transnistria that facilitates Russia’s influence, which poses the biggest barrier in  
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Moldova’s EU integration process. Therefore, it is highly subjective to compare Moldova 
to Austria in pledging a neutral EU accession. Austria had a lot to offer to its European 
partners before its EU membership; Moldova does not.  
Latvia’s situation, on the other hand, looks fairly similar initially to that of 
Moldova. Like Moldova, Latvia had multiple problems before its EU accession as a 
result of being under Soviet control. The Latvian political system at the beginning of the 
1990s was in chaos, its economy devastated, its military dismantled, and the society was 
divided in half into Latvians and Russians. Latvia quickly improved, however, and 
rapidly oriented itself toward the West. Its government decided overwhelmingly that the 
only way to the EU was through NATO membership and therefore aimed at a double 
integration process into the both Euro-Atlantic institutions. As a result, political, 
economic, social, and military reform in Latvia quickly evolved and democratic norms 
such as free and fair elections, constructive dialogue between the ruling and opposition 
parties, and freedom of the press were introduced. Its economic ties with the East were 
gradually decreased, replaced by trade arrangements with Western countries that required 
Latvia to achieve a certain level of liberal market economy by the beginning of 2000. 
This improved the living standards of the Latvian people and facilitated pro-Western 
public support. Its defense reformation process transformed the Latvian armed forces to a 
small but capable military. Consequently, within a decade of its independence, Latvia had 
become a true free democracy with a stable economy and reliable military. These 
achievements along with the public’s support made Latvia sufficiently attractive for 
NATO and the EU to grant it membership status. 
In light of the Latvian process, the center-rightists seem correct in calling for 
Moldova’s following the Latvian way toward European integration. By rejecting its 
neutrality and announcing its desire to join NATO, Moldova could get NATO assistance 
and benefit from its expertise in the European integration process. First, considering that 
the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU are based on the same values and that 
both organizations would be involved, the integration process would be at least twice as 
fast. Second, the process of introducing EU-driven reforms would give Moldovan 
officials an additional source of constructive pressure to quicken the implementation of 
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those reforms. Third, when NATO is interested in a country it supports not only its armed 
forces but also every other dimension of its reformation process.244 With NATO 
membership Moldova would get a total level of security, thus opening the door to foreign 
investment. This would ultimately foster a national economy that would be closer to EU 
standards. Logically, if Latvia, along with most of the Central and Eastern European 
countries, succeeded by adopting this model of integration, Moldova should have a good 
chance, too.   
This might indeed have been a perfect integration path for Moldova, but 
unfortunately it is too late. By moving too slowly following its independence when the 
Russians were weak, the Moldovan governments gave Russia a greater chance to increase 
its influence over Moldova. Today, when Russia is not as weak as it was at the beginning 
of the 1990s and has more power to impose its ambitions,245 the “rules of the game” have 
changed in Moldova’s disfavor. If it gave up its neutral status now, Moldova would 
probably lose forever any possibility of reintegrating the country, because Russia is 
determined to make sure that NATO does not move into this part of the continent. Thus, 
if Moldova abolishes its neutrality, Russia will probably never pull out its troops. Also, 
during a NATO integration process, Russia could easily put economic pressure on 
Moldova that would inflict heavy damages on its already weak economy. Because of its 
great economic dependence on Russia, Moldova should avoid its economic sanctions at 
least until the economic balance changes. Russian economic pressure would neither 
provide a decent standard of living for the Moldovan people nor integrate the country into 
the European institutions. And it is impossible to think that the EU would like Moldova 
any weaker than it is today. 
Therefore, although integrating into both NATO and the EU is the best-case 
scenario for Moldova, abolishing neutrality and trying to do it now could be fatal for the 
country. Given these conclusions, the thesis ends in the next section with some policy 
recommendations.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Judging from the present research, it is obvious that Moldova’s pro-Western 
vector is essential and irreversible. But while conducting the reforms that will help the 
country integrate into the EU, Moldova cannot afford the open antagonism with Russia 
that Latvia had. Political ambiguity is not the worst option246 and in fact is crucial for 
Moldova in the near future, especially since Moldova’s governments have exercised 
political ambiguity since it regained its independence from the former USSR. But its 
political ambiguity must favor the West, and both the EU and NATO must be made 
aware of the real reasons behind it. Although Moldova’s neutrality has not helped it to get 
rid of Russian troops so far, there is no point in abolishing it in favor of NATO now; 
doing so would only lead the Russians to claim they have more “moral” reasons in 
upholding the status-quo. Moreover, this neutral “façade” should be maintained in order 
to enable the international community to use its legal rights to continuously request that 
Russian troops be removed from Moldova. Because it is not working today does not 
mean it will not work in the future when conditions may be different.  
Maintaining the current status quo may also give Moldova the time it needs to 
gradually reorient its economy to the West. Not being fond of Russia does not mean that 
Moldova does not need their economic markets. However, Moldova needs to quickly 
distance itself from its economic dependence on Russia. And it must tell the West, 
preferable in secret, why it must maintain an ambiguous position at present so that the 
West can trust Chisinau and continue to assist it as it has begun doing. A move to 
Western markets will eventually improve Moldova’s economy and a style of life that will 
attract Transnistria. While today the difference between the two banks of the Nistru River 
is relatively small, an eventual economically prosperous Moldova with an EU future may 
resolve the Transnistrian conflict on its own. Chisinau must not even think about trading 
its European future in exchange for the country’s integration. As the Cyprus problem has 
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shown, the balance of powers can change over time,247 thus Moldova should focus on 
improving and pay less attention to the conflict. When the time is right, Transnistria will 
beg for Chisinau central control.  
Chisinau leaders should also work closely with the West to implement the 
necessary reforms and seek greater preference and favors in exchange for its loyalty. As 
it has demonstrated so far, the EU can gradually help resolve Moldova’s problems. Thus, 
Moldovan leaders should comply with Brussels in every aspect if they do not want to do 
the same with Moscow. For the time being, Chisinau has little choice; it must accept a 
more senior hand and for its own sake, it had better choose Brussels.   
While doing so, Moldova needs to reassess its defense policies and tacitly prepare 
for NATO accession in the future. NATO is the only guaranty that the country will be 
prosperous, since even Russia does not mess with NATO. Chisinau therefore should 
transform its armed forces and with peaceful intentions get closer to NATO. It should 
intensify its activity in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programs and increase its military 
capabilities, especially since it has signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with 
NATO. It has set all the legal frameworks, now only action is required, especially 
because NATO seems interested. A closer military partnership with NATO will also 
attract more attention from the United States, which could be a crucial player if 
interested. Moldova’s participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom in a conflict-
reconstruction effort was a good start; now Chisinau needs more interoperability with the 
United States, which leads NATO. Achieving a small but capable military, as Latvia did, 
may be enough to achieve NATO membership. Moreover, if Moldova ever gets there, the 
“gates” to foreign investment will be open forever.  
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In regard to the EU, the only thing Chisinau should do is execute Brussels’ 
directives. This will change Moldova’s political, economic, and social frameworks. What 
Moldova needs are a pluralistic political system, a liberalized economy, and a Western 
society. It also needs basic freedoms that meet the EU’s standards, including the fourth 
dimension of a state’s power –an unrestricted media. The EU can facilitate these if it sure 
that there is no way back. Chisinau must assure the EU that its efforts and resources are 
not wasted but spent wisely. Moreover, the EU reforms will benefit the country even if it 
is not in the EU, but in thinking about accession into the Union, their implementation is 
mandatory. Additionally, if Moldova enhanced its military, it would add an additional 
point of attractiveness to the EU even if Moldova does not join NATO. The EU also 
needs prepared soldiers for its European Security and Defense Policy.  
In sum, this thesis concludes that the best course of action for Moldova is to 
integrate into the EU in the fastest time and at the lowest cost possible, with a status-quo 
double political game that should be seriously reoriented toward Brussels while tricking 
Moscow. Moldova’s neutrality should be maintained so that Russia will continue to feel 
in control, while Moldova uses all means possible to move toward West.  
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